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PASSIVE VOTER SUPPRESSION: CAMPAIGN
MOBILIZATION AND THE EFFECTIVE
DISFRANCHISEMENT OF THE POOR
Bertrall L. Ross II & Douglas M. Spencer
ABSTRACT—A recent spate of election laws tightened registration rules,
reduced convenient voting opportunities, and required voters to show
specific types of identification in order to vote. Because these laws make
voting more difficult, critics have analogized them to Jim Crow Era voter
suppression laws.
We challenge the analogy that current restrictive voting laws are a
reincarnation of Jim Crow Era voter suppression. While there are some
notable similarities, the analogy obscures a more apt comparison to a
different form of voter suppression—one that operates to effectively
disfranchise an entire class of people, just as the old form did for African
Americans. This form of suppression excludes the poor.
To account for the effective disfranchisement of the poor, we develop
a more robust theory of voting than currently exists in the legal literature.
Drawing on rational choice and sociological theories of voting, we show how
information, affiliation with formal organizations, and integration into social
networks of politically active individuals are far more important to the
decision to vote than the tangible costs of voting associated with the new
voter suppression.
Using this expanded account of voting, we identify the role of political
parties and their mobilization activities in the effective disfranchisement of
the poor. Relying on the same proprietary data as the Obama campaign in
2008 and 2012 (and hundreds of campaigns since), along with other public
sources of data, we show how campaigns employ a “calculus of contact” to
decide whom to mobilize. That calculus leads campaigns to
disproportionately neglect the poor when canvassing, calling, and sending
political mailers to potential voters—mobilization activities that have a
sizeable turnout effect. In our view, the most significant voter suppression
tactics of the twenty-first century are therefore not what legislatures are
doing, but what campaigns are not doing.
We argue that a first step in combating this passive voter suppression
should involve changing the information environment of campaigns: the
amount and type of information about potential voters that the state makes
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available to campaigns. Such a change could force campaigns to adjust their
calculus of contact and contact more low-income people during election
season. Including the poor as targets of campaign mobilization would be an
important first step toward a more egalitarian democracy.
AUTHORS—Chancellor’s Professor of Law, University of California,
Berkeley. Professor of Law & Public Policy, University of Connecticut.
Visiting Professor, Harris School of Public Policy, University of Chicago
(2018–2019). We are grateful to Naomi Cahn, Christopher Elmendorf,
David Fontana, Michael Gilbert, Joy Milligan, Spencer Overton,
Peter Siegelman, and participants at workshops sponsored by the UC
Berkeley Center for the Study of Law and Society, George Washington
University Law School, and the University of Connecticut School of Law
for helpful feedback.
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Passive Voter Supression

INTRODUCTION
The past decade has seen the proliferation of election laws designed to
suppress the vote.1 For many critics, the enactment of voter identification
(voter ID) laws, the tightening of registration rules, and the reduction or
elimination of convenient voting opportunities mark a return to a Jim Crow
Era in which literacy tests, poll taxes, and white primaries served to suppress
the African American vote.2 Given this striking analogy to our nation’s
painful racial history, it is no surprise that voting rights advocates, legal
scholars, and social scientists have focused so much attention on these tools
as a form of new voter suppression.3

1

According to the Brennan Center for Justice,

25 states have put in place new restrictions since [the 2010 election]—15 states have more
restrictive voter ID laws in place (including six states with strict photo ID requirements), 12 have
laws making it harder for citizens to register (and stay registered), ten made it more difficult to
vote early or absentee, and three took action to make it harder to restore voting rights for people
with past criminal convictions.
New Voting Restrictions in America, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., http://www.brennancenter.org/newvoting-restrictions-america [https://perma.cc/T7D4-W77M].
2 See, e.g., N.C. State Conference of NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 229 (4th Cir. 2016)
(referring to North Carolina’s omnibus election reform bill as “the most restrictive voting law North
Carolina has seen since the era of Jim Crow”); SPENCER OVERTON, STEALING DEMOCRACY: THE NEW
POLITICS OF VOTER SUPPRESSION (2006); TOVA ANDREA WANG, THE POLITICS OF VOTER SUPPRESSION:
DEFENDING AND EXPANDING AMERICANS’ RIGHT TO VOTE, at xiv (2012) (arguing that voter reforms that
suppress voting are rarely legitimate and stem from years of such practices); Keith G. Bentele & Erin E.
O’Brien, Jim Crow 2.0? Why States Consider and Adopt Restrictive Voter Access Policies, 11 PERSP. ON
POL. 1088, 1092 (2013) (noting that comparisons between recent voting restrictions and historical voter
suppression “are not difficult to make as voter suppression is viewed by many researchers familiar with
the history of American elections as a pervasive and consistent feature of U.S. political practice and
institutions.”); Atiba R. Ellis, The Cost of the Vote: Poll Taxes, Voter Identification Laws, and the Price
of Democracy, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 1023, 1025 (2009) (arguing that voter ID laws requiring photo ID
“are similar to other restrictions on the franchise, such as property requirements and poll taxes”); Ryan
P. Haygood, The Past as Prologue: Defending Democracy Against Voter Suppression Tactics on the Eve
of the 2012 Elections, 64 RUTGERS L. REV. 1019, 1021 (2012) (“[T]his current assault on voting rights is
consistent with the story of America’s contested relationship with democracy . . . .”); Alexander Keyssar,
Voter Suppression Returns: Voting Rights and Partisan Practices, HARV. MAG., July–Aug. 2012, at 28,
31 (“The recent wave of ID laws (and their cousins) bears a close resemblance to past episodes of voter
suppression.”).
3 The following is a representative, though not exhaustive, sample of scholarship. On the effects of
voter ID laws on turnout, see Stephen Ansolabehere, Effects of Identification Requirements on Voting:
Evidence from the Experiences of Voters on Election Day, 42 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 127 (2009); Matt A.
Barreto et al., The Disproportionate Impact of Voter-ID Requirements on the Electorate—New Evidence
from Indiana, 42 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 111 (2009).
On the effects of voter ID laws on minority turnout, see Rachael V. Cobb et al., Can Voter ID Laws
Be Administered in a Race-Neutral Manner? Evidence from the City of Boston in 2008, 7 Q. J. POL. SCI.
1 (2012); Zoltan Hajnal et al., Voter Identification Laws and the Suppression of Minority Votes, 79 J.
POL. 363 (2017).
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Emphasis on the new voter suppression, however, has led voting rights
advocates and legal scholars to overlook an entirely different form of voter
suppression that operates much like the old. For at least the last fifty years,
the turnout of persons in the lowest income quintile (a group we define as
“the poor”) has been at such a low level that neither major political party has
had real incentives to advance their interests in the political process.4
Voting rights advocates and scholars have been drawn to the analogy
between old and new voter suppression.5 But the more pressing analogy is
between the effective disfranchisement of African Americans in the past and
the effective disfranchisement of the poor in the present. Recent studies have
shown that the poor—like African Americans in the Jim Crow South—go
essentially unrepresented in the political process.6 This lack of representation
appears rooted in the poor’s very low rate of voting compared to more
affluent groups.7 The poor’s exclusion from politics ultimately contributes to
For scholarship on the determinants of voter ID laws, see Daniel R. Biggers & Michael J. Hanmer,
Understanding the Adoption of Voter Identification Laws in the American States, 45 AM. POL. RES. 560
(2017).
On voter registration and cutbacks to early voting, see, for example, MICHAEL J. HANMER, DISCOUNT
VOTING: VOTER REGISTRATION REFORMS AND THEIR EFFECTS (2009); FRANCES FOX PIVEN ET AL.,
KEEPING DOWN THE BLACK VOTE: RACE AND THE DEMOBILIZATION OF AMERICAN VOTERS (2009);
Stephen Ansolabehere & David M. Konisky, The Introduction of Voter Registration and Its Effect on
Turnout, 14 POL. ANALYSIS 83 (2006); Barry C. Burden & Jacob R. Neiheisel, Election Administration
and the Pure Effect of Voter Registration on Turnout, 66 POL. RES. Q. 77 (2013); Russell Weaver, The
Racial Context of Convenience Voting Cutbacks: Early Voting in Ohio During the 2008 and 2012 U.S.
Presidential Elections, 2015 SAGE OPEN 1.
4 See NOLAN M. MCCARTY ET AL., POLARIZED AMERICA: THE DANCE OF IDEOLOGY AND UNEQUAL
RICHES 119 (2d ed. 2016) (noting that those “who are ineligible to vote are [increasingly] concentrated
at the bottom of the income distribution, so politicians feel little pressure to respond to their interests”).
For an overview of the literature on the disproportionate voice of the wealthy, see William W. Franko
et al., Class Bias in Voter Turnout, Representation, and Income Inequality, 14 PERSP. ON POL. 351, 354
(2016).
5 See, e.g., Bentele & O’Brien, supra note 2. Another reason why legal scholars, at least, have ignored
the disfranchisement of the poor is due to the Court’s refusal to recognize the poor as a class in need of
special protection under the Constitution. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 323 (1980) (rejecting a
claim for special judicial protection under the Equal Protection Clause brought by low-income individuals
seeking Medicaid reimbursement for medically necessary abortions on the basis of the unreasoned
conclusion that “poverty, standing alone, is not a suspect classification”). This determination led to a
constitutional scholarly exodus away from issues concerning the equal protection rights of the poor that
encompass voting rights as well.
6 See, e.g., LARRY M. BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE NEW
GILDED AGE 260–65 (2008) (testing the relationship between the ideological views of different income
classes and United States senator roll call votes in the late 1980s and early 1990s and finding that “the
views of low-income constituents had no discernible impact on the voting behavior of their senators”);
MARTIN GILENS, AFFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE: ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND POLITICAL POWER IN
AMERICA 79–81 (2012) (finding that on issues of minimum wage, abortion, and sending troops to Bosnia,
“when preferences between the well-off and the poor diverge, government policy bears absolutely no
relationship to the degree of support or opposition among the poor”).
7 See, e.g., JAN E. LEIGHLEY & JONATHAN NAGLER, WHO VOTES NOW? DEMOGRAPHICS, ISSUES,
INEQUALITY, AND TURNOUT IN THE UNITED STATES 1, 6 (2014) (finding a consistent 30% gap in reported
turnout between high- and low-income individuals since the 1970s). According to the U.S. Census, the
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the extreme political and economic inequality that characterizes the twentyfirst century’s new gilded age.8
However, the sources of the effective disfranchisement of African
Americans in the past and the poor in the present are distinct. Whereas the
old voter suppression imposed tangible barriers that led to the
disfranchisement of African Americans, such tangible obstacles explain very
little of the rich–poor turnout disparity.9 Other factors are far more influential
in the effective disfranchisement of the poor than the cost barriers to voting
associated with the new voter suppression.
Our argument is informed by a broader theoretical account of voting
than that which appears in the legal academic literature and popular debates.
Those discussions tend to focus on the tangible cost of voting as the primary
determinant of voting.10 While we do not dispute the inverse relationship
between tangible cost and voting, we highlight other overlooked factors
relevant to the voting decision that can explain the effective disfranchisement
of the poor.
Rational choice and sociological theories of voting open up a host of
additional explanations for the poor’s nonvoting. In these theories, factors
such as information costs, affiliation with formal organizations, and
inclusion within social networks are more important to an individual’s
turnout decision than the tangible cost of voting.11
When we incorporate these factors into the turnout decision, a more
complete picture emerges of the poor’s low participation in elections. As
rational choice theories emphasize, in order to vote, individuals need
information about where, when, and how to vote. People also need a reason
to vote, which can be derived from information about the candidate’s past
actions, her policy positions and prescriptions for the future, and how the
three relate to the individual’s preferences and needs. People who lack
information, or find it hard to evaluate due to less education, may not be able
to differentiate enough between candidates to see much benefit from voting
average reported turnout among individuals with household incomes under $30,000 is below 50% while
the average reported turnout among those with household incomes over $150,000 is more than 80%. U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, VOTING AND REGISTRATION IN THE ELECTION OF NOVEMBER 2016: TABLE 7 (2017),
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/voting-and-registration/p20-580.html
[https://perma.cc/JT8F-MUP5].
8 See generally Franko et al., supra note 4, at 363 (finding that when political participation is skewed
more to the “economic elite,” bias is high and the “distributional outcomes shaped by who holds elected
office and the policies they enact become more skewed in favor of the rich”); Benjamin I. Page et al.,
Democracy and the Policy Preferences of Wealthy Americans, 11 PERSP. ON POL. 51, 68 (2013) (finding
that “the affluent participate disproportionately in politics” and that their policy preferences are consistent
with actual policy in multiple areas, which “is, at least, suggestive of significant influence”).
9 See infra Section II.A.
10 See Ellis, supra note 2, at 1025.
11 See infra Sections II.A–II.B.
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and therefore may decide to abstain. The poor tend to be less educated and
educational attainment has been consistently shown to be the most important
determinant of turnout.12
Sociological theories of voting explain that membership in formal
groups or integration in social networks that include other voters and people
interested in politics can subsidize the information costs to voting, provide
solidary benefits for voting, and create a sense of civic duty to vote.13 Since
the 1950s, sociological studies have shown that the poor are less likely to be
affiliated with formal organizations and to be integrated into social networks
of voters than other socioeconomic classes.14 This relative social isolation is
therefore another critical factor contributing to the effective
disfranchisement of the poor.
A broader understanding of the sources of the effective
disfranchisement of the poor opens the door to more responsive solutions
than simply eliminating new voter suppression barriers. Ideal solutions
might include equalizing educational opportunities for the poor and
providing the poor with the necessary time and resources to integrate
themselves into formal organizations and social networks. But these
solutions would require a massive degree of public investment into poor
communities, which is hard to imagine in the current political context, when
social safety nets are being shredded rather than reinforced.15
Alternative, more feasible, solutions involve a critical intervening
variable that influences the decision to vote—the mobilization activities of
candidates and political parties. Campaigns subsidize the information costs
to voting by educating individuals on the logistics of voting—the time, place,
and process of voting—and providing individuals with accounts of the
candidate’s past actions, proposals for the future, and how the two might
impact the potential voter’s needs and interests. Campaign mobilization
activities can also activate formal and informal social networks through what
experimental studies describe as a contagion effect. Individuals contacted by
campaigns often share political information and embed a sense of duty to

12 See, e.g., Rachel Milstein Sondheimer & Donald P. Green, Using Experiments to Estimate the
Effects of Education on Voter Turnout, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 174, 174 (2010) (“The powerful relationship
between education and voter turnout is arguably the most well-documented and robust finding in
American survey research.”).
13 See infra Section II.B.
14 See sources cited infra note 150.
15 See, e.g., Bertrall L. Ross II, Addressing Inequality in the Age of Citizens United, 93 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1120, 1132–35 (2018) (describing the decline in redistributive policies and protections for lower
income and working-class people in the United States over the past forty years).
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vote within others in their social networks, thereby increasing the number of
voters in the network.16
Understanding mobilization activities as key intervening variables that
influence turnout sheds light on an important source of the effective
disfranchisement of the poor. In deciding whom to mobilize, campaigns
utilize what we label a “calculus of contact.” Campaigns use a cost–benefit
calculation to engage in the most cost-effective mobilization strategies. The
primary benefit to campaigns from contacting individuals is a favorable vote,
with the campaigns’ goal being to produce enough favorable votes to win
elections.17 Not every contact produces an equal probability of a favorable
vote. Therefore, campaigns tend to make two probability calculations in their
decisions about whom to contact. First, campaigns assess the probability that
contact will influence an individual to vote, and to vote favorably for the
candidate as a result of the contact. Second, they assess how important it is
to contact particular individuals in order to win the election. The costs of
contact include the time and resources devoted to a canvassing operation and
the data and technology needed to inform the probability calculations on the
benefits side.
This calculus of contact has contributed to a consistent socioeconomic
class disparity in whom campaigns contact.18 Campaigns contact the poor
less because the poor vote less than other socioeconomic classes.19 This low
turnout is due to the higher costs—information and otherwise—that they
incur to vote and their relative lack of integration into formal organizations
and informal social networks.20 The poor’s relative lack of voting history
contributes to greater uncertainty about their future voting behavior and thus
increases the risk to campaigns that these individuals might fail to produce a
vote, or that they might even vote for one’s opponent in the election.
That contact gap between the poor and members of other
socioeconomic classes is of monumental importance in explaining why the
poor vote less than other socioeconomic classes. Experimental studies

16 Dan Braha & Marcus A. M. de Aguiar, Voting Contagion: Modeling and Analysis of a Century of
U.S. Presidential Elections, 12 PLOS ONE 1, 1 (2017) (“These results suggest that social contagion
effects are becoming more instrumental in shaping large-scale collective political behavior, with
implications on democratic electoral processes and policies.”); David W. Nickerson, Is Voting
Contagious? Evidence from Two Field Experiments, 102 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 49, 54 (2008) (“The
unavoidable conclusion is that voting is a highly contagious behavior and an important determinant of
turnout.”).
17 See, e.g., Gary W. Cox et al., Mobilization, Social Networks, and Turnout: Evidence from Japan,
50 WORLD POL. 447, 447 (1998) (“[A] party will target those unlikely to vote if not mobilized, but who
would very likely support the party in question if they did get to the polls.”).
18 See infra Section II.C.
19 See infra Section II.C.
20 See infra Section II.C.
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testing the relationship between voter contact and turnout have shown that
campaign contact substantially increases turnout.21 Other experimental
studies have shown that the indirect effect of mobilization, the so-called
contagion effect, multiplies the turnout effect from contact.22
We argue that campaigns’ use of the calculus of contact to
disproportionately orient their mobilization activities away from the poor
operates as a form of voter suppression. This form of voter suppression is
passive in that it arises from campaigns’ neglect of a part of the population
in their mobilization activities. While distinct in operation, this passive voter
suppression shares something in common with the old active voter
suppression of the post-Reconstruction redemption period: it has effectively
disfranchised an entire class of voters.
What can the law do about passive voter suppression? Since political
campaigns, and not the state, are the principal agents of passive voter
suppression and since passive voter suppression arises from a decision by a
campaign to not do something, a constitutional claim against the practice is
dubious, at best. Using the law to respond to passive voter suppression will
therefore require shifting from the conventional use of law in the election
space as a tool to prohibit conduct, to law as a tool to incentivize conduct.
In this Article, we argue for a legal intervention that could represent a
first step in combating passive voter suppression that targets the information
that states make available to campaigns for electoral purposes. States vary in
terms of what information they make accessible to campaigns. Nearly half
of the states give campaigns access to registered voters’ partisan affiliation
21 DONALD P. GREEN & ALAN S. GERBER, GET OUT THE VOTE: HOW TO INCREASE VOTER
TURNOUT 9 (3d ed. 2015) (“[T]he more personal the interaction between campaign and potential voter,
the more it raises a person’s chances of voting.”); Kevin Arceneaux & David W. Nickerson, Who Is
Mobilized to Vote? A Re-analysis of 11 Field Experiments, 53 AM. J POL. SCI. 1, 11–12 (2009)
(highlighting the unreported heterogeneous effects in previous experiments by showing that the effects
of contact on turnout (between 1.3 to 13.2 percentage points) depends on the premobilization propensity
to vote and the competitiveness of the election); Alan S. Gerber & Donald P. Green, The Effects of
Canvassing, Telephone Calls, and Direct Mail on Voter Turnout: A Field Experiment, 94 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 653, 661 (2000) [hereinafter Gerber & Green, The Effects of Canvassing] (“Face-to-face interaction
dramatically increases the chance that voters will go to the polls.”); Donald P. Green et al., Getting Out
the Vote in Local Elections: Results from Six Door-to-Door Canvassing Experiments, 65 J. POL. 1083,
1094 (2003) (“Each successful contact with a registered citizen raises that individual’s probability of
voting by approximately 7 percentage points . . . .”); Melissa R. Michelson, Getting Out the Latino Vote:
How Door-to-Door Canvassing Influences Voter Turnout in Rural Central California, 25 POL. BEHAV.
247, 256–57 (2003) (finding that canvassing is effective even in low turnout elections in rural areas,
increasing an individual’s likelihood of voting up to sixteen percentage points among Latino Democrats);
David W. Nickerson, Volunteer Phone Calls Can Increase Turnout: Evidence from Eight Field
Experiments, 34 AM. POL. RES. 271, 271 (2006) [hereinafter, Nickerson, Volunteer Phone Calls Can
Increase Turnout] (“[P]hone calls are found to boost turnout 3.8 percentage points.”); David Niven, The
Mobilization Solution? Face-to-Face Contact and Voter Turnout in a Municipal Election, 66 J. POL. 868,
868 (2004) (“Controlling for their past voting history, the face-to-face mobilization effort did increase
turnout by about five points.”).
22 See sources cited supra note 16.
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and voting history, eight states deny campaigns access to both pieces of
information, and the remaining states grant campaigns access to individuals’
voting history or partisan affiliation, but not both.23 All states except
Massachusetts collect and make accessible to campaigns information about
only registered voters, leaving campaigns completely in the dark about the
identity, address, voting history, if any, and partisan affiliation of
unregistered persons.24
We argue that the current information environments for campaigns in
the different states contribute in varying degrees to the socioeconomic biases
in contact that lead to passive voter suppression. Campaigns use lists of
registered voters to identify targets for contact and they tend to contact
individuals with more substantial voting histories and clearer partisan
orientations.25 That leads campaigns to orient their mobilization activities
away from the poor because the poor are substantially more likely than other
income classes to be unregistered, to lack a voting history, and to have more
ambiguous or unknown partisan affiliations.26
An important intervention that could reduce these socioeconomic class
disparities in campaigns’ mobilization activities involves changing the
information environments in which campaigns operate. Here we set forth a
preliminary proposal as the best means for combating passive voter
suppression: for states to provide more information to campaigns regarding
eligible voters’ partisan preferences through automatic voter registration
while withholding individuals’ voting histories. Changing the information
available to campaigns is an important practical first step, but more reforms
would be necessary to effectively enfranchise the poor. In future work, we
will focus on other interventions aimed at making elections more competitive
as additional steps to creating a more egalitarian democracy.
This Article proceeds in four Parts. In Part I, we engage the analogy
between old and new voter suppression. We argue that while the analogy
holds when thinking about the use of voter suppression for partisan electoral
advantage, it ultimately shifts attention away from a more troubling issue:
the passive voter suppression that effectively disfranchises low-income
communities. In Part II, we broaden the theoretical lens used in legal
scholarship to explain individuals’ decisions to vote, introducing social
science theories of voting that incorporate information costs, affiliation with
formal organizations, and integration into politically active informal social
23 See infra Table 1; see also infra notes 261–262 and accompanying text (providing a taxonomy of
states on the basis of the information they make available to campaigns).
24 See infra Section IV.B.2.
25 See infra Section IV.A.
26 See infra note 226 and accompanying text.
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networks as key variables in turnout decisions. In Part III, we turn our
attention to the effect of campaign mobilization activities on voting. Using
proprietary data from a campaign data vendor, Catalist, and other public
sources of data, we identify a consistent and persistent socioeconomic classbased disparity in campaigns’ voter contact over the past fifty years and
relate it to the phenomenon we label passive voter suppression. Finally, in
Part IV, we suggest an initial legal intervention that could reduce passive
voter suppression by shifting campaigns’ calculus of contact to incentivize
more equal contacts with the poor.
I.

THE ANALOGY BETWEEN THE OLD AND NEW VOTER SUPPRESSION

On July 10, 2012, then-Attorney General Eric Holder addressed the
annual convention for the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People (NAACP).27 In the year leading up to the speech, five
Republican-controlled state legislatures had moved toward adopting strict
photo ID requirements to vote.28 Republican leaders in those states justified
the new ID laws on the basis of mostly unsubstantiated assertions of voter
impersonation fraud.29 The day before Holder’s speech, a trial began in
federal district court where the State of Texas was seeking a declaratory
judgment against the Department of Justice to secure preclearance of its new
voter ID law under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.30
27 Eric Holder, U.S. Att’y Gen., Address at the NAACP Annual Convention (July 10, 2012),
available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-eric-holder-speaks-naacp-annualconvention [https://perma.cc/7Q4R-6AX2].
28 See History of Voter ID, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (May 31, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/
research/elections-and-campaigns/voter-id-history [https://perma.cc/77S5-LVU9] (noting that Kansas,
Mississippi, Tennessee, Texas, and Wisconsin made moves to adopt strict photo identification
requirements for voting in 2011).
29 See, e.g., Editorial Board, Voting Laws Must Be Carefully Considered, GREEN BAY PRESS
GAZETTE, Dec. 9, 2010, at A5 (quoting Wisconsin Republican state senator Scott Fitzgerald, “we
continue to see these isolated incidents of people trying to vote five, six times a day; people voting based
on some sort of fraudulent documentation that’s offered”); William D. Hicks et al., A Principle or a
Strategy? Voter Identification Laws and Partisan Competition in the American States, 68 POL. RES. Q.
18, 20–23 (2015) (describing the overwhelming Republican support for voter ID laws in the state
legislatures that have adopted them and the overwhelming Democratic opposition to these laws); Kris
Kobach, Opinion, Voter ID Laws are Good Protection Against Fraud, WASH. POST (July 13, 2011),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/voter-id-laws-are-good-protection-against-fraud/2011/07/08
/gIQAGnURBI_story.html [https://perma.cc/8PEN-5HP5] (op-ed by Kansas Secretary of State and
architect of Kansas voter ID law who wrote that “[u]nfortunately, voter fraud has become a welldocumented reality in American elections”); see also infra note 72.
30
See Texas v. Holder, 888 F. Supp. 2d 113, 114–15 (D.D.C. 2012) (denying Texas’s request
because evidence showed the law would “likely have a retrogressive effect” in violation of Section 5 of
the VRA), vacated and remanded, 570 U.S. 928 (2013) (overruled in light of Shelby County v. Holder,
570 U.S. 529 (2013), overturning Section 5 as unconstitutional); Devlin Barrett, U.S. and Texas Battle in
Court
over Voter I.D., WALL ST. J. (July 9, 2012), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527023040
22004577516953618032404 [https://perma.cc/C534-LUPD].
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In his speech, Holder referred to the Justice Department’s findings that
the Texas voter ID law “would be harmful to minority voters.”31 Holder noted
how “[u]nder the proposed law, concealed handgun licenses would be
acceptable forms of photo ID—but student IDs would not.”32 And he
described how “[m]any of those without IDs would have to travel great
distances to get them—and some would struggle to pay for the documents
they might need to obtain them.”33 Then, in an unscripted part of the speech,
Holder announced, “we call those poll taxes.”34 That was not the first time
that someone drew the analogy between voter ID laws and poll taxes—
between new voter suppression tools and old.35 But coming from the chief
law enforcement officer of the United States and the closest cabinet member
to then-President Barack Obama, the analogy proved particularly
noteworthy. Some expressed outrage about the analogy. A Wall Street
Journal editorial accused Holder of playing “the race card to drive up black
voter turnout” in the coming presidential election.36 Others applauded the
Attorney General and repeated the analogy, describing voter ID laws as
modern-day poll taxes and literacy tests.37
Thus far no one has interrogated the analogy between the old and new
voter suppression in any depth. The remainder of Part I does that. We show
that the analogy holds insofar as the focus is on the use of voter suppression
tools to advance the goal of partisan electoral advantage. But this
interrogation also reveals the limits of the analogy as it ignores a critical
distinction between the old and new voter suppression. The old voter
suppression of the post-Reconstruction redemption period resulted in the
effective disfranchisement of an entire group of voters—African Americans.
The new voter suppression of the current era has not had this disfranchising
effect on any group of voters—even the poor who are most vulnerable to
such laws. Finally, this interrogation exposes the key issue that the analogy
between old and new voter suppression ultimately masks: the persistent
effective disfranchisement of the poor through passive means.

31

See Holder, supra note 27.
Id.
33 Id.
34 NAACP, 2012 NAACP Convention – Eric Holder, YOUTUBE 17:05–17:20 (July 10, 2012), https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mafc42MM5zs [https://perma.cc/Q3JL-QTMY].
35 See, e.g., Ellis, supra note 2, at 1025–26.
36 Editorial, Holder’s Jim Crow Politics, WALL ST. J. (July 10, 2012, 7:22 PM), https://www.wsj.
com/articles/SB10001424052702304022004577519202610207274 [https://perma.cc/GAZ2-8U67].
37 See, e.g., Charles Postel, Why Voter ID Laws Are like a Poll Tax, POLITICO (Aug. 7, 2012, 12:26
AM), https://politi.co/2yXQqbK [https://perma.cc/4US5-G93E] (“[T]hese laws function very much like
a poll tax.”); Al Sharpton, Opinion, Voting in Jeopardy, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2012, at A13 (“These new
ID laws take us backward; they truly are nothing more than modern-day poll taxes and literacy tests.”).
32
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A. Where the Analogy Holds
The 2016 presidential election surprised many. Very few people,
including perhaps the future President himself, expected Donald Trump to
win.38 Even fewer expected Trump to win the state of Wisconsin, a state that
Barack Obama won rather decisively in 2008 and 2012, and one that Hillary
Clinton did not campaign in out of confidence that the state would remain a
pillar in a blue wall of states assuring Democratic victory in the election.39
But the blue wall crumbled as Trump won the state.40 The margin was
narrow—less than 23,000 votes (a mere 0.77%) separated the two
candidates—but that margin guaranteed the winner all ten of the state’s
electoral college votes.41
In 2011, Republican Governor Scott Walker and the Republicancontrolled state legislature passed a strict voter ID law.42 Court challenges
would delay the law from going into effect until 2015.43 Of the closely
contested blue wall states that Trump won in the 2016 presidential election,
Wisconsin was the only one to have strict photo ID requirements. Some
suggested that the ID requirement changed the election outcome in the
state.44
38 Michael Wolff, Donald Trump Didn’t Want to Be President, N.Y. MAG. (Jan. 8, 2018),
http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/01/michael-wolff-fire-and-fury-book-donald-trump.html
[https://perma.cc/8NLH-9S7C].
39 HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, WHAT HAPPENED 394–95 (2017).
40 Craig Gilbert et al., How Clinton Lost “Blue Wall” States of Michigan, Pennsylvania,
Wisconsin, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Nov. 9, 2016, 9:03 PM, updated Nov. 10, 2016, 11:31 AM),
https://www.freep.com/story/news/politics/2016/11/09/93572020 [https://perma.cc/L9N7-N3VQ].
41 Wisconsin Results, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2017, 11:22 AM), https://www.nytimes.com/elections/
2016/results/wisconsin [https://perma.cc/25M9-5RT3]; see also Jack E. Riggs et al., Electoral College
Winner’s Advantage, 42 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 353, 353 (2009) (“The winner-take-all methodology of
awarding electoral votes, [is] currently used by all states except Maine and Nebraska . . . .”).
While close, the election in Wisconsin was not pivotal like Florida famously was in the 2000
presidential election contest between George Bush and Al Gore. See Thomas E. Mann, Reflections on the
2000 U.S. Presidential Election, BROOKINGS INST. (Jan. 1, 2001), https://brook.gs/2NiaZ64
[https://perma.cc/9KHH-234X]. Although Trump lost the popular vote by nearly three million votes, he
won the Electoral College by 77 votes as other parts of the blue wall, Pennsylvania and Michigan, also
fell by similarly small margins (0.72% and 0.23% respectively). Philip Bump, Donald Trump Will Be
President Thanks to 80,000 People in Three States, WASH. POST (Dec. 1, 2016, 2:38 PM), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/12/01/donald-trump-will-be-president-thanks-to-80000people-in-three-states [https://perma.cc/TVD3-TQDJ]; Presidential Election Results: Donald J. Trump
Wins, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2017, 9:00 AM), https://nyti.ms/2PcFpLz [https://perma.cc/S2FH-U93Q].
42 See WIS. STAT. § 6.79(2)(a); History of Voter ID, supra note 28.
43 See Shawn Johnson & Laurel White, As Voting Begins, a Look Back at the Fight over Wisconsin’s
Voter ID Law, WIS. PUB. RADIO (Sept. 26, 2016, 5:00 AM), https://www.wpr.org/voting-begins-lookback-fight-over-wisconsins-voter-id-law [https://perma.cc/9ZRF-MXLJ].
44 See, e.g., KENNETH R. MAYER & MICHAEL G. DECRESCENZO, SUPPORTING INFORMATION:
ESTIMATING THE EFFECT OF VOTER ID ON NONVOTERS IN WISCONSIN IN THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTION 5 (2017), https://elections.wisc.edu/voter-id-study [https://perma.cc/DG5K-8ZYV] (“We
estimate that 11.2% of nonvoting registrants in Dane and Milwaukee counties were ‘deterred’ in some
way from voting by the voter ID law . . . .”).
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Hillary Clinton seemed to agree. In her election postmortem, What
Happened, Clinton used Wisconsin as a prime example of the effect of voter
suppression on the outcome of the election. One study that Clinton cited
found that the Wisconsin voter ID law “helped reduce turnout by 200,000
votes, primarily from low-income and minority areas” that tend to be more
Democratic.45 She then pointed to a 13% decline in turnout in the heavily
Democratic and majority low-income and minority city of Milwaukee.46
Finally, she compared turnout in Wisconsin with that of the neighboring
states of Minnesota and Illinois. In Minnesota, where the state legislature did
not impose new voter restrictions for the 2016 election, “turnout in heavily
African American counties declined much less and overall turnout was
essentially flat.”47 In Illinois, where the state legislature actually passed laws
designed to make it easier to vote, turnout increased by 5% overall, and
African American turnout was 14% higher than in Wisconsin.48 A Wisconsin
Republican state representative predicted that “the new law would help
Trump pull off an upset in the state.” Clinton concluded, “[i]t turns out he
was right.”49
So many factors go into an election outcome that it is difficult to
identify any as decisive.50 But Clinton’s analysis is consistent with empirical
studies that suggest voter ID laws can matter in close elections. Empirical
studies of the 2014 midterm and 2016 presidential election were mixed in
their findings about the effect of voter ID laws on the turnout of groups that
tend to vote Democratic—racial minorities, persons with disabilities, the
poor, and the young.51 Some studies focusing on specific jurisdictions found
no overall turnout effect while others found that voter ID laws potentially

45

CLINTON, supra note 39, at 420.
Id. As of July 2018, the nonwhite population of Milwaukee is 54.2%. See Quickfacts, Milwaukee
City, Wisconsin, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/milwaukeecitywisconsin
[https://perma.cc/RNM4-6U9B].
47 CLINTON, supra note 39, at 420.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 It is inherently difficult to determine which of the many factors relevant to an election outcome
are ultimately decisive, but Republican lawmakers that are behind the adoption of the voter ID laws seem
to think that the effects of these laws could prove decisive in close elections. See, e.g., Hicks, supra note
29, at 29 (finding that legislatures with more Republicans in states that are more competitive are
significantly more likely to adopt restrictive voter ID laws than other states).
51
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-14-634, ELECTIONS: ISSUES RELATED TO
STATE VOTER IDENTIFICATION LAWS 39–43 (2014), https://www.gao.gov/assets/670/665966.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R897-6879] (summarizing studies of the effect of voter ID laws on racial minority
turnout); Bernard L. Fraga & Michael G. Miller, Who Does Voter ID Keep from Voting?, 13, 20–21, 21
tbl.2 (Dec. 14, 2018) (working paper) (on file with authors) (finding 42.3% of the 15,682 individuals who
filed a “reasonable impediment declaration” for lack of voter ID and were matched to the Texas voter file
in 2016 were nonwhite).
46
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reduced the turnout of Democratic-leaning groups up to 5%.52 These studies,
however, predated the implementation of most of the strict photo ID laws
currently in place, including in Wisconsin.
Political scientists Zoltan Hajnal, Nazita Lajevardi, and Lindsay
Nielson recently published the first empirical study that measures the effect
of strict photo ID laws on turnout nationwide.53 Using data from the
Cooperative Congressional Election Study between 2006 and 2014, the
authors compare turnout for different Democratic-leaning groups in states
with strict photo ID laws and states without strict photo ID laws, controlling
for other factors that could influence turnout.54 They report that in general
election contests, the turnout gap between Latinos and Whites is more than
twice as large in strict ID states (13.5%) compared to non-strict ID states
(4.9%).55 The Asian–White turnout gap is 11.5% in strict ID states compared
to 6.5% in non-strict ID states, and the gap between White and African
American voters is 5.1% in strict ID states compared to 2.9% in non-strict
ID states.56 Such increases in the turnout gap between mostly Republican
52 Compare Daniel J. Hopkins et al., Voting but for the Law: Evidence from Virginia on Photo
Identification Requirements, 14 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 79, 88, 96–100 (2017) (finding that 222 ballots,
cast provisionally for lack of voter ID, were never counted of nearly 2.19 million votes cast in the 2014
Virginia midterm election (0.0001%); factoring in the potential deterrence effect of voter ID, the authors
show that Democratic voters were 5.1% less likely to vote after the implementation of Virginia’s strict
voter ID law, though turnout among Black voters increase by approximately 2.5%), and U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 51, at 52 (finding that voter ID laws reduced turnout among African
American registrants by 3.7% in Kansas and 1.5% in Tennessee, relative to white registrants) with
Benjamin Highton, Voter Identification Laws and Turnout in the United States, 20 ANN. REV. POL. SCI.
149, 164 (2017) (reviewing the voter ID literature and concluding “[t]o the extent that sound evidence
exists, it shows modest turnout effects and only minor differences across politically relevant groups”).
53 Hajnal et al., supra note 3, at 364.
54 Id. at 367.
55 Hajnal et al., supra note 3, at 369 (citing Cooperative Congressional Election Study, HARV. U.,
available at https://cces.gov.harvard.edu/pages/welcome-cooperative-congressional-election-study
[https://perma.cc/U8R4-XKE2]).
56 Id. at 369–71. The effect sizes that the authors find are even larger for primary elections. The
turnout gap is more than three times as large in strict ID states for Latinos and Asians, and more than five
times as large for African American voters. As the authors note, “[i]n primaries, the effects of voter
identification laws are more pronounced and more negative for those on the political left.” Id. at 371.
The Hajnal et al. findings about the racially disproportionate effect of voter ID laws triggered an
intense debate amongst political scientists. In a response to the article, Professors Justin Grimmer, Eitan
Hersh, Marc Meredith, Jonathan Mummolo, and Clayton Nall challenged the study’s findings. Justin
Grimmer et al., Obstacles to Estimating Voter ID Laws’ Effect on Turnout, 80 J. POL. 1045, 1045–46
(2018). The response criticized Hajnal et al.’s use of survey data, coding decisions, and reliance on crosssectional regressions that “[do] not adequately account for unobserved baseline differences between states
with and without these laws.” Id. at 1045–46. Using Hajnal et al.’s data, but employing a fixed effects
model, Grimmer et al. found that voter ID laws “increased turnout among White, African American,
Latino, Asian American, and mixed-race voters by 10.9, 10.4, 6.5, 12.5, and 8.3 percentage points in
general elections, respectively.” Id. at 1049. Furthermore, they found that the large white–minority voting
gaps in states that adopted voter ID laws are driven by “increased white turnout . . . not by a drop in
minority turnout.” Id.
In a reply, Hajnal et al. claim that Grimmer et al. “present[] a misleading and flawed picture of the
impact of strict ID laws” and reproduce findings supporting the claim in their original article that voter
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Whites and mostly Democratic racial minorities could change election
outcomes in close races.57
Proponents of the new voter suppression laws have claimed that they
were intended to guard against fraud, the perception of fraud, and to
otherwise protect the integrity of elections.58 But the history of these new
voter suppression laws suggests that lawmakers had partisan electoral
advantage as their primary goal.59 Although there are some scattered
statements by lawmakers indicating the partisan (and even racist)
motivations driving the adoption of the new voter suppression laws, it is the
circumstantial evidence surrounding these laws that is most persuasive.60 In
2001, fourteen states, including both states with Democratic and Republican
majorities, had laws requesting that voters show some form of identification
at the polls.61 These laws allowed voters to present a variety of different

ID laws have a racially disproportionate effect for Latinos in general elections and for Latinos, Blacks,
Asian-Americans, and multiracial Americans in primary elections. Zoltan Hajnal et al., We All Agree:
Strict Voter ID Laws Disproportionately Burden Minorities, 80 J. POL. 1052, 1052–53 (2018).
57 See Wide Gender Gap, Growing Educational Divide in Voters’ Party Identification, PEW RES.
CTR. 7–8 (Mar. 20, 2018), https://www.people-press.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2018/03/03-20-18Party-Identification-CORRECTED.pdf [https://perma.cc/27EH-X7UG] (describing the continued racial
divisions in partisan identification).
58 See, e.g., Michael D. Gilbert, The Problem of Voter Fraud, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 739, 741, 743–
46 (2015) (describing the anti-fraud defense of voter ID laws).
59 Bentele & O’Brien, supra note 2, at 1089 (“[W]e argue that the Republican Party has engaged in
strategic demobilization efforts in response to changing demographics, shifting electoral fortunes, and an
internal rightward ideological drift among the party faithful.”); Daniel R. Biggers & Michael J. Hanmer,
Understanding the Adoption of Voter Identification Laws in the American States, 45 AM. POL. RES. 560,
580 (2017) (“Using this newly collected data, we determined that the story behind the adoption of a
variety of different voter ID laws is primarily a partisan one . . . . These results provide substantial support
for our hypotheses: The switch to pivot player status by the Republican Party creates the ability and
impetus to modify existing voter ID laws,” where “pivot player status” refers to the switch from minority
party to control of the legislature and governorship.); Seth C. McKee, Politics Is Local: State Legislator
Voting on Restrictive Voter Identification Legislation, 2015 RES. & POL. 1, 6 (“Beyond the widely
anticipated finding that Republicans are much more supportive of restrictive voter ID legislation . . .
among Republican legislators, a higher black district population increases legislators’ support for voter
ID, whereas among Democratic lawmakers, a higher black district population reduces legislators’
likelihood of voting in favor of restrictive voter ID legislation.”).
60 For examples of lawmakers expressing their motivation for voter ID laws, see Aaron Blake,
Republicans Keep Admitting that Voter ID Helps Them Win, for Some Reason, WASH. POST: THE
FIX (Apr. 7, 2016) https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/04/07/republicansshould-really-stop-admitting-that-voter-id-helps-them-win [https://perma.cc/XBM2-WVGK] (quoting
Wisconsin Republican representative Glenn Grothman as saying, “I think Hillary Clinton is about the
weakest candidate that the Democrats have ever put up and now we have photo ID and I think photo ID
is going to make a little bit of a difference as well”; Pennsylvania state House Majority Leader Mike
Turzai (R) saying that voter ID “is going to allow Governor Romney to win the state of Pennsylvania”;
Pennsylvania GOP Chairman Robert Gleason who pointed to Obama’s smaller margin of victory in 2012
compared to 2008 and said, “I think that probably photo ID helped a bit in that”; and Buncombe County,
North Carolina Republican precinct chairman Don Yelton who said, “if [voter ID] hurts a bunch of lazy
blacks that want the government to give them everything, so be it”).
61 See Hicks, supra note 29, at 20–21; History of Voter ID, supra note 28.
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forms of identification documents and voters were allowed to cast a regular
ballot even when they lacked identification.62
In 2002, the Help America Vote Act’s (HAVA) response to the election
administration and accessibility problems associated with the 2000 election
required those who register by mail to provide voter identification when they
vote.63 In 2005, the bipartisan Commission on Federal Election Reform went
further and proposed a uniform system of voter identification in which
individuals would be required to present photo IDs at the polls, with such
IDs being made readily accessible to those who lack it.64 That Republicanintroduced proposal proved controversial, producing three formal dissents.65
That same year, Republican-controlled legislatures in Georgia and Indiana
passed the first two state laws requiring voters to present a photo
identification in order to vote.66 In 2006, the Republican-controlled
legislature in Missouri followed suit,67 but the state’s Supreme Court struck
down the law as inconsistent with the state constitution.68 The Court held that
the concern about voter fraud among state lawmakers was real, but that the
problem was not, noting a lack of supportive evidence.69
In 2008, state lawmakers in Indiana defended the state’s voter ID law
against a federal constitutional challenge but were unable to present a single
prior example of voter impersonation fraud in the State.70 The only example

62

History of Voter ID, supra note 28.
Help America Vote Act of 2002 § 303(b)(ii) (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 21083(b)(2)(A));
see also WANG, supra note 2, at 79 (identifying the narrow ID requirement in HAVA as the precursor to
“a subsequent flood of more-stringent voter identification requirements enacted at the state level”).
64 COMM’N ON FED. ELECTION REFORM, BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN U.S. ELECTIONS: REPORT OF THE
COMMISSION ON FEDERAL ELECTION REFORM, at iv (2005), https://www.eac.gov/assets/1/6/
Exhibit%20M.PDF [https://perma.cc/RJ7Y-MZHR] (“[T]o make sure that a person arriving at a polling
site is the same one who is named on the list, we propose a uniform system of voter identification based
on the ‘REAL ID card’ or an equivalent for people without a drivers [sic] license. To prevent the ID from
being a barrier to voting, we recommend that states use the registration and ID process to enfranchise
more voters than ever.”).
65 Spencer Overton, Voter Identification, 105 MICH. L. REV. 631, 633 n.4 (2007) (identifying the
formal dissenters as himself and another racial-minority-commission member and Democratic U.S.
Senator Tom Daschle).
66 GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-417 (2006); IND. CODE § 3-10-1-7.2 (2006).
67 MO. REV. STAT. § 115.427 (2006).
68 Weinschenk v. State, 203 S.W.3d 201, 204 (Mo. 2006) (en banc) (per curiam).
69 Id. at 218 (“While it is agreed here that the State’s concern about the perception of fraud is real, if
this Court were to approve the placement of severe restrictions on Missourians’ fundamental rights owing
to the mere perception of a problem in this instance, then the tactic of shaping public misperception could
be used in the future as a mechanism for further burdening the right to vote or other fundamental rights.”).
70 Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 226 (2008) (discounting the state’s interest
against fraud because “the State has not come across a single instance of in-person voter impersonation
fraud in all of Indiana’s history. Neither the District Court nor the Indiana General Assembly that passed
the Voter ID Law was given any evidence whatsoever of in-person voter impersonation fraud in the State”
(internal citations omitted)).
63
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the state presented involved absentee voter fraud that the law did not target.71
What the Indiana legislatures did have was statistics on who possessed photo
IDs, particularly driver’s licenses. Those statistics revealed large disparities
in White and minority ownership of photo identification, which indicated
that the law would impact a larger share of minority, more Democratic voters
than White, more Republican voters.72 The United States Supreme Court
nonetheless upheld Indiana’s law against a facial challenge. After
Republicans gained control of both houses in twenty-six legislatures along
with twenty-nine state governorships in 2010, strict voter ID laws
proliferated. Such laws passed only in states where Republicans completely
controlled the legislature and the Governorship.73 States continued to justify
these laws on the basis of fraud prevention. But like Georgia, Missouri, and
Indiana, the new adopters offered scant evidence of the voter impersonation
fraud that voter ID laws would prevent while continuing to ignore much
stronger evidence of absentee ballot fraud that voter ID laws would not
address.74 This strange policy choice had partisan roots. Absentee voters are
mostly Republican-leaning while voters that go to the polls are mostly
Democratic-leaning.75 While the Republican state legislatures lacked
71 Id. at 195–96 (referring to “Indiana’s own experience with fraudulent voting in the 2003
Democratic primary for East Chicago Mayor—though perpetrated using absentee ballots and not inperson fraud” (internal footnote omitted)).
72 Importantly, the district court granted the State of Indiana’s summary judgment motion in part
because plaintiffs did not introduce “evidence of a single, individual Indiana resident who will be unable
to vote as a result of [the voter ID law] or who will have his or her right to vote unduly burdened by its
requirements.” Indiana Democratic Party v. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d 775, 783 (S.D. Ind. 2006). On this
point, the Court of Appeals noted that even though the petitioners had not been able to produce anybody
who said they would vote but for lack of ID, their claim was valid inasmuch as the voter ID law “may
require the Democratic Party and the other organizational plaintiffs to work harder to get every last one
of their supporters to the polls.” Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 952 (7th Cir. 2007),
aff’d, 553 U.S. 181 (2006).
73 See History of Voter ID, supra note 28.
74 See e.g., Brief for the United States in Opposition, Abbott v. Veasey, 137 S. Ct. 612 (2017) (No.
16-393), 2016 WL 6958563, at *3 (comparing the approximately 20 million votes cast in Texas during
the prior decade to the mere “two cases of in-person voter impersonation” that “were identified and
prosecuted to conviction”); LORRAINE C. MINNITE, THE MYTH OF VOTER FRAUD 57–76 (2010)
(cataloging the low incidence of voter impersonation fraud in select states); Natasha Khan & Corbin
Carson, Data: Voter Impersonation a Rarity, WASH. POST, Aug. 12, 2012, at A3 (describing “[a] new
nationwide analysis of more than 2,000 cases of alleged election fraud over the past dozen years . . . [that]
found 10 cases of alleged in-person voter impersonation since 2000” (emphasis omitted)).
75 See, e.g., Alan Blinder & Michael Wines, North Carolina Republicans Targeted Voter Fraud. Did
They Look at the Wrong Kind?, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/05/
us/politics/north-carolina-vote-fraud-absentee.html [https://perma.cc/NY49-PJZH] (“Republicans had
generally dominated absentee ballots that were cast through the mail . . . .”); Sarah Childress, Why Voter
ID Laws Aren’t Really About Fraud, PBS FRONTLINE (Oct. 20, 2014), https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/
frontline/article/why-voter-id-laws-arent-really-about-fraud [https://perma.cc/N692-UYQA] (“In 2012,
nearly half, or 46 percent, of mail-in voters were aged 60 and older, and more than 75 percent were White,
according to an analysis by Michael McDonald, a political science professor at the University of Florida
who tracks demographic trends in voting. Older White Americans generally are more likely to vote
Republican.”); Adam Liptak, Error and Fraud at Issue as Absentee Voting Rises, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7,
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evidence of voter impersonation fraud, they certainly had access to data
showing racial and class disparities, often large disparities, in photo ID
possession.76 Those circumstantial bits of evidence combined with naked
assertions of partisan intent point to partisan electoral advantage as the
primary reason for the adoption of voter ID laws.
Voter ID laws were not the only voter suppression tool that Republicans
appeared to use for partisan advantage. Voter roll purges by Republicancontrolled secretaries of state in Georgia and Ohio;77 the suspension and
reduction of early voting in the Republican-controlled states of Florida,
Georgia, Ohio, and Wisconsin;78 restrictions on registration drives or third
party registration in Republican-controlled Florida, Iowa, and Texas;79 and
proof of citizenship voting requirements in Republican-controlled Alabama,
Kansas, and Tennessee all targeted groups critical to the Democratic
coalition that elected and re-elected President Obama.80
Insofar as the new voter suppression aims to achieve partisan electoral
advantage, these laws share much in common with the old voter suppression
of the past. The Fifteenth Amendment and Reconstruction temporarily
introduced a new era of racially inclusive politics in which African
Americans under the banner of the Republican Party voted and elected their
own to political office in the South.81 However, the Democratic Party and the
slavocracy that powered it would not go quietly. A relatively short period of
2012, at A1 (“Republicans are in fact more likely than Democrats to vote absentee. In the 2008 general
election in Florida, 47 percent of absentee voters were Republicans and 36 percent were Democrats.”).
76 Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Att’y Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice to C.
Havird Jones, Jr., Esq., Assistant Deputy Att’y Gen., S.C., at 2 (Dec. 23, 2011), available at
http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/279907-doj-south-carolina-voting.html
[https://perma.cc/Z66A-5UU5] (“In other words, according to the state’s data, which compare the
available data in the state’s voter registration database with the available data in the state’s DMV database,
minority registered voters were nearly 20% more likely to lack DMV-issued ID than white registered
voters, and thus to be effectively disenfranchised by Act R54’s new requirements.”); Letter from Thomas
E. Perez, Assistant Att’y Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice to Keith Ingram, Dir. of Elections,
Elections Div., Office of the Tex. Sec’y of State, at 3 (Mar. 12, 2012), available at https://
www.documentcloud.org/documents/324586-justice-departments-decision-on-the-texas-voter.html
[https://perma.cc/KRH5-XKHP] (“[A]ccording to the state’s own data, a Hispanic registered voter is at
least 46.5 percent, and potentially 120.0 percent, more likely than a non-Hispanic registered voter to lack
this identification.”).
77 CAROL ANDERSON, ONE PERSON, NO VOTE: HOW VOTER SUPPRESSION IS DESTROYING OUR
DEMOCRACY 75–81 (2018).
78 ARI BERMAN, GIVE US THE BALLOT: THE MODERN STRUGGLE FOR VOTING RIGHTS IN AMERICA
262–63 (2015).
79 Id. at 269; WENDY WEISER & MAX FELDMAN, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, THE STATE OF
VOTING 2018, at 7 (2018).
80 BERMAN, supra note 78, at 261.
81 See generally ERIC FONER, FREEDOM’S LAWMAKERS: A DIRECTORY OF BLACK OFFICEHOLDERS
DURING RECONSTRUCTION, at xi (Louisiana Paperback ed. 1996) (providing a comprehensive directory
of the over 1,500 African Americans who held political office in the South during the Reconstruction
Era).
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enfranchisement was followed by two stages of voter suppression targeting
African Americans and later other poor White voters. Beginning in the
1870s, white violence and intimidation targeted black voters and other
supporters of the Republican Party with the goal of deterring them from
voting and giving the Democratic Party an advantage in elections.82 The
Democratic Party reinforced this partisan advantage achieved by violence
and intimidation by using fraud and manipulation of the ballot box.83 Both
sets of tactics allowed the Democratic Party to regain control of all the state
legislatures in the former Confederate states by the mid-1870s.84
But even in this era of violence and fraud, African Americans continued
to be a political force in the South.85 An opening remained for partisan rivals
of the Democratic Party to create class-based alliances between poor Whites,
who had been politically subordinated by Democrats (and other party elites)
during and after the slavery era, and African Americans seeking to defend
themselves from the reimposition of systemic racial subordination at the
heart of the Democratic Party ideology.86
The threat of a cross-racial class coalition led to the second stage of
voter suppression for partisan advantage in the 1890s. First Independents,
then Populists, began to mobilize lower class Whites and African Americans
to win elections.87 The Populist coalition pushed the Democrats out of power
temporarily in North Carolina, Virginia, and Tennessee, won legislative
seats in most Southern states, and closely contested statewide offices in
several of the states.88 In some states, Democrats were only able to turn back
Populist challenges through fraud and manipulation at the ballot box.89 Under
threat of federal intervention to stop Democratic fraud and ballot box

82 See, e.g., Laughlin McDonald et al., Georgia, in QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE IMPACT
OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, 1965–1990, at 67, 68 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman eds., 1994);
Frank R. Parker et al., Mississippi, in QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH, supra, at 136, 137; Robert
Brischetto et al., Texas, in QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH, supra, at 233, 235.
83 J. MORGAN KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN POLITICS: SUFFRAGE RESTRICTION AND THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ONE-PARTY SOUTH, 1880–1910, at 17–18 (1974); McDonald et al., supra note
82, at 68.
84 MICHAEL PERMAN, STRUGGLE FOR MASTERY: DISFRANCHISEMENT IN THE SOUTH, 1888–1908,
at 9–10 (2001)
85 See STEVEN F. LAWSON, BLACK BALLOTS: VOTING RIGHTS IN THE SOUTH, 1944–1969, at 7 (1976)
(describing how African Americans in the South “continued to exercise the franchise and to hold public
office in the 1880s and 1890s”).
86 See Armand Derfner, Racial Discrimination and the Right to Vote, 26 VAND. L. REV. 523, 535
(1973) (describing the ongoing political threat that African Americans posed to Democratic hegemony in
1890).
87 KOUSSER, supra note 83, at 25–26.
88 Id. at 26; PERMAN, supra note 84, at 32.
89 PERMAN, supra note 84, at 32 (describing how massive electoral fraud by Democrats was
necessary to prevent the Populist coalition from winning control of the legislature).
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manipulation, the African American threat to partisan advantage became
even more salient.90
States started to look to Mississippi and South Carolina as examples for
how to suppress the minority vote without being subject to federal legislative
and judicial interventions: through residence requirements for voting, poll
taxes, and literacy and understanding tests.91 Other Democratic-controlled
state legislatures followed suit by adopting similar types of voter suppression
laws including White-only primary elections and expanded felon
disfranchisement laws that targeted crimes for which African Americans
were more likely to be accused and convicted.92 The result was Democratic
Party hegemony in the South that would remain essentially unchallenged
until the 1960s.93
Thus the new and old voter suppression do bear this important
similarity: both had partisan electoral advantage as their effect and goal. The
old voter suppression helped restore Democratic Party hegemony in the
South following Reconstruction. The new voter suppression has not yet had
this widespread electoral effect, but it has arguably helped Republican
candidates win closely contested elections throughout the nation. But in a
critical other respect overlooked by those who rely on the analogy, the
strategies diverge. The old voter suppression involved the effective
disfranchisement of an entire class of voters that the new voter suppression
is nowhere near achieving.
B. Where the Analogy Fails
The ideology of white supremacy was at the core of the post-Civil War
Democratic Party. In their virulent opposition to the Fifteenth Amendment,
Democratic congressmen repeatedly proclaimed, “[T]his is a white man’s
90 KOUSSER, supra note 83, at 29–30 (describing the failed federal Lodge Bill, which would have
required federal “supervision of all phases of registration and voting in national elections, and in effect
nullifying certain practices and laws that facilitated fraud and disfranchisement”).
91 See Orville Vernon Burton et al., South Carolina, in QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH, supra
note 82, at 191, 193 (describing the South Carolina Eight Box Law and its racially discriminatory effect
on voting); Parker et al., supra note 82, at 137 (describing Mississippi’s adoption of a cumulative poll tax
and literacy requirements for voting during its constitutional convention in 1890).
92 See, e.g., DARLENE CLARK HINE, BLACK VICTORY: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE WHITE PRIMARY
IN TEXAS 69–94 (new ed. 2003) (describing the adoption and use of white primaries throughout the South
as a tool to deprive African Americans of all influence in elections); JEFF MANZA & CHRISTOPHER
UGGEN, LOCKED OUT: FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 41–68 (2006)
(describing the racially discriminatory origins of felon disfranchisement).
93 KOUSSER, supra note 83, at 224–37 (describing the transition from multi-party democracy to
single-party oligarchy in the South at the beginning of the twentieth century); Merle Black & Earl Black,
Deep South Politics: The Enduring Racial Division in National Elections, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF SOUTHERN POLITICS 401, 404 (Charles S. Bullock III & Mark J. Rozell eds., 2012) (“From the
beginning of the twentieth century until the 1964 elections, every member of the U.S. Senate and House
of Representatives from the Deep South was a Democrat.”).
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government.”94 Democrats tried to rally support for their white supremacy
vision of government (and opposition to the Fifteenth Amendment) by
advancing racist claims about the competency and capability of African
Americans to engage in the project of self-government.95 The Democrats also
tried to stoke fear amongst Whites in the South with predictions of retribution
from African Americans if they were given the opportunity to rule.96
The campaign against the Fifteenth Amendment ultimately failed, but
white supremacist ideology remained as a motivating force underlying the
old voter suppression. Democrats used white supremacy as a means to bridge
the class divides between Whites in the South and to secure white support
and involvement in programs of voter suppression, designed not merely to
achieve partisan electoral advantage but also the effective disfranchisement
of African Americans as a class.97
In the two post-Reconstruction stages of disfranchisement, Democrats
constructed bogeymen designed to rally unified white support for voter
suppression. The first bogeyman, “Negro rule,” was constructed in response
to the African American enfranchisement and officeholding of the brief
Reconstruction period.98 Feeding into the broad southern white fear of
political subordination to African Americans—something southern Whites
deemed a realistic prospect given the number of African Americans in the
South—Democrats encouraged the violence and intimidation targeting
Black voters that was a central feature of the first stage of voter suppression.99
Democrats proved unable to effectively disfranchise African Americans, but
it was not for lack of effort or desire. The resilience of African Americans
and southern fear of the return of northern supervision or control over the

94 This Democratic Party mantra during the debate over the Reconstruction was famously captured
in a political cartoon by Thomas Nast in the Harper’s Weekly depicting three white men representing the
three wings of the Democratic Party with their feet on the back and head of a black man lying face down
grasping an American flag, representing his newly granted constitutional rights. Thomas Nast, This Is a
White Man’s Government, HARPER’S WEEKLY, Sept. 5, 1868, at 568, available at
https://blackhistory.harpweek.com/7Illustrations/Reconstruction/ThisIsAWhiteMansGov.htm
[https://perma.cc/9C9F-SM6M].
95 See, e.g., PERMAN, supra note 84, at 22 (quoting Mississippi Senator James Z. George’s public
statement about the great problem of black suffrage published in the Vicksburg Commercial Herald
asserting that African Americans “though possessing many virtues and many excellent qualities, have
never yet developed the slightest capacity to create, to operate, or to preserve constitutional institutions”).
The Senator’s view about “‘the great problem’ . . . was neither remarkable nor unusual. It was widely
shared.” Id. at 22–23.
96 See ERNEST MCPHERSON LANDER, JR., A HISTORY OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1865–1960, at 40 (1970)
(describing the role of Ben Tillman, Governor and later Senator of South Carolina, in propagating a fear
of Negro rule to secure support for voter suppression measures that disfranchised African Americans and
poor Whites).
97 PERMAN, supra note 84, at 27.
98 LAWSON, supra note 85, at 10; PERMAN, supra note 84, at 22–24.
99 LAWSON, supra note 85, at 11.
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South functioned as barriers to effective disfranchisement.100 But the
violence and intimidation combined with fraud and manipulation at the ballot
box did reduce the black officeholding that the Democrats associated with
“Negro rule.”101
The Democratic Party and other white supremacists in the South,
however, did not give up on the cause of black disfranchisement. When
“Negro rule” faded as a plausible description of political reality in the mid1870s after Democrats gained control over all Southern state legislatures,
Democrats constructed a new bogeyman, “Negro domination.”102 According
to this account, African Americans posed a domination threat so long as they
could vote and be mobilized by rivals to the Democratic Party.103 Democrats
used this fear of “Negro domination” to weaken the cross-class Black–White
coalition that underpinned support for the Independents and the Populists in
the 1880s and 1890s and to ultimately secure the necessary support for the
legal devices used to suppress the vote.104
Once the Democrats gained political support for the second stage of
voter suppression through law, they set as their goal the complete eradication
of the political threat posed by African American voters.105 The cumulative
poll taxes, literacy and understanding tests, white primaries, felon
disfranchisement laws, grandfather clauses and other legal vehicles did just
that as they reduced black voter registration and voting to a level where
Blacks could not exercise any influence over elections or secure any
representation in the political process.106
The new voter suppression is distinct from the old insofar as it does not
disfranchise entire groups. Though racism likely plays a role in these voter
suppression efforts, the evidence indicates that partisan electoral advantage

100 See, e.g., Peyton McCrary et al., Alabama, in QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH, supra note 82,
at 38, 42 (“The likelihood of federal intervention [after the passage of the Reconstruction Amendments]
prevented the Democrats from simply disfranchising blacks and made it necessary to find alternative
methods of assuring white supremacy.”).
101 ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863–1877 (Henry
Steele Commager & Richard B. Harris eds., updated ed. 2014).
102 LAWSON, supra note 85, at 10; PERMAN, supra note 84, at 22–24.
103 PERMAN, supra note 84, at 24.
104 Id.; see also LAWSON, supra note 85, at 10 (“[T]he spectre of ‘[Negro] domination’ succeeded
[as] [t]he obsession with white supremacy replaced the preoccupation with economic issues . . . .”).
105 See BLACK & BLACK, supra note 93, at 402 (“To achieve these goals [of Negro subordination and
insulation against external interference with local affairs], southern white men in the 1890s and early
1900s combined violence and new requirements for voter registration (primarily poll taxes and/or tests
of literacy and ‘understanding’) to expel virtually all black men from the electorate.”)
106 See LAWSON, supra note 85, at 14–15 (describing the reduction of the black electorate in states
throughout the South after 1900).
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is the overriding motivation and the narrower effects of these newer tools.107
In fact, the new voter suppression tools have not come remotely close to
disfranchising an entire class of citizens. The laws have had only a minor
effect on turnout when compared to the effect of the old voter suppression
tools. Hajnal et al.’s nationwide study, which found the largest negative
turnout effect from strict voter ID laws, still only found a statistically
significant negative turnout effect from these laws in general elections for
one of the four racial minority groups: Latinos.108 Although only a few
studies measure the effects of other new voter suppression tools such as voter
roll purges, the reduction or suspension of early voting, restrictions on
registration drives, or citizenship proof requirements for voting on the
turnout of the targeted groups, those studies suggest a negative turnout effect
but not nearly at the level of effectively excluding entire groups of voters.109
Differences in costs imposed on potential voters can explain the
distinctive disfranchising effects of the old and new voter suppression tools.
Whereas the old suppression tools imposed impossible-to-surmount costs on
African Americans who sought to vote, the new voter suppression tools
impose much lower costs that racial minorities and the poor can overcome.
A recognition of that reality is not meant to condone voter ID laws or any of
the other new voter suppression tools, nor to dismiss their effects as barriers
to voting for the many people who cannot afford the costs of a photo ID or
are discriminatorily purged from voter rolls. We fully agree that denial of the
vote to anyone is a democratic harm that should be unacceptable in any selfgoverning republic. Instead, our goal is to shine a light on something that the
analogy between the old and new voter suppression unintentionally
obscures.

107 See, e.g., BERMAN, supra note 78, at 255 (quoting racist statements from the sponsor of the Texas
voter ID law in support of the law); see also supra note 3 (identifying direct and circumstantial evidence
of the partisan motivation behind state voter ID laws).
108 See Hajnal et al., supra note 3, at 368–71 (finding that strict voter ID laws had a statistically
negative effect only for Latinos in general elections). The study did, however, find that strict voter ID
laws had a statistically significant effect for African Americans, Latinos, and Asian-Americans in primary
elections. Id. These findings raise the question of whether something other than voter ID laws and the
other variables contained in the model is influencing the turnout decision.
109 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 51, at 48–49 (finding a 3.7% and 1.5%
decline in African American turnout from the 2008 to the 2012 general elections in Kansas and Tennessee,
respectively, after the two states imposed citizenship requirements for voting—the highest turnout drop
for any racial minority group); Adam J. Berinsky, The Perverse Consequences of Electoral Reform in the
United States, 33 AM. POL. RES. 471, 480–82 (2005) (finding from a review of scholarship that higher
propensity voters took much more advantage of early voting, absentee voting, and internet voting than
lower propensity voters, which suggests that the reduction or elimination of convenience voting would
not have a large turnout effect on lower propensity voters).
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C. What the Analogy Masks
There is an entire class of citizens that has been effectively
disfranchised: the poor. In one important respect, the poor are similarly
situated to African Americans in the South after the adoption of legal voter
suppression tools during the redemption period. The poor’s turnout numbers
have been reduced to such a low level that the poor do not influence
elections. As recent empirical studies have shown, elected actors do not
respond to the poor’s interests through the political process.110 That, for us,
is the definition of effective disfranchisement, and it undermines our
democracy.
In the 2016 presidential election, there was, according to the United
States Census, a 30% reported turnout gap between the wealthy and the
poor.111 The gap might lead one to ask whether the new voter suppression
laws, like the old, are effectively disfranchising the poor, who are most
vulnerable to increases in the tangible costs of voting. But turnout data from
elections preceding the recent spate of voter suppression laws suggest
otherwise. For example, in the 2004 presidential election, the last
presidential election before Indiana and Georgia became the first states to
require photo IDs to vote in elections, the reported turnout gap between the
rich and poor in the U.S. Census was actually higher than it was in 2016.112
In fact, a 25% to 35% gap in reported turnout between the highest and lowest
income classes categorized in the U.S. Census has persisted since the census
started collecting voting data by income in 1964.113

110 Bertrall L. Ross II & Su Li, Measuring Political Power: Suspect Class Determinations and the
Poor, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 323, 368–70 (2016) (finding that legislators were less likely to support
antipoverty legislation in districts with large poor populations); see also Ross, supra note 15, at 1132–35
(describing the decline in redistributive policies and protections for lower income and working-class
people in the United States over the past forty years); Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Political
Powerlessness, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1527, 1577–79 (2015) (summarizing the empirical literature on policy
nonresponsiveness to the poor).
111 Specifically, 80.3% of citizens who earned more than $150,000 voted in 2016 as compared to
48.5% of citizens who earned less than $30,000. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 7.
112 The reported turnout gap between the richest 20% of American citizens and the poorest 20% was
40.3% in 2004 and 33.8% in 2016. Id. (2016 data); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, VOTING AND REGISTRATION
IN THE ELECTION OF NOVEMBER 2004: TABLE 8 (2004), https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2004/demo/
voting-and-registration/p20-556.html [https://perma.cc/3C5N-7TV2] (reporting 2004 data).
113 See KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN ET AL., THE UNHEAVENLY CHORUS: UNEQUAL POLITICAL VOICE
AND THE BROKEN PROMISE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 153 (2012) (reporting a similar gap through
2008); Jan E. Leighley & Jonathan Nagler, Socioeconomic Class Bias in Turnout, 1964–1988: The Voters
Remain the Same, 86 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 725, 728 tbl.1 (1992) (reporting consistent gap between 25%–
35% from 1964–1988).
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FIGURE 1: AVERAGE FEDERAL ELECTION TURNOUT BY INCOME, 2006–2016a

a

Average turnout in federal elections between 2006 and 2016 by equally sized income quintiles and
the status of voter ID laws in the voter’s state. Source: Cooperative Congressional Election Study
(CCES) validated voter file.

To illustrate why we think this gap is one of the most pressing and
overlooked voting rights issues of our time, we use the Cooperative
Congressional Election Study (CCES) validated voter file to plot the average
turnout of individuals in five equally sized income quintiles between 2006
and 2016 (these quintiles do not correspond with the U.S. Census income
class categories, which explains the relatively smaller turnout gap between
the highest and lowest income quintile in the CCES data). In Figure 1, we
plot turnout by status of voter ID laws in the voter’s state (strict ID versus no
strict ID) and election type (primary versus general).
As Figure 1 indicates, income is a much stronger predictor of turnout
than presence of strict voter ID laws. Turnout is never more than 2% lower
in states with strict voter ID laws compared to states with no strict ID
requirements. In fact, for some income groups the turnout in states with strict
ID laws was higher than in states with no strict ID laws.114 On the other hand,
there is a 3% to 6% turnout gap between each income quintile, and the
difference between turnout in the highest quintile (those who earn
approximately $70,000 or more) and the lowest quintile (those who earn less

114 A recent study of turnout in Rhode Island found differential effects before and after the state’s
2014 photo ID law, specifically that turnout increased by an estimated 3.7% among high socioeconomic
status registered voters in midterm elections. Francesco Maria Esposito et al., Effects of Photo ID Laws
on Registration and Turnout: Evidence from Rhode Island 30 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 25503) (Jan. 2019), http://www.nber.org/papers/w25503 [https://perma.cc/G9U2-FDDR].
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than approximately $20,000) is 19% to 20%.115 Furthermore, the income gap
exists in states with and without strict voter ID laws, suggesting that strict ID
laws are not driving the income turnout gap. Thus, the fixation of voting
rights advocates and democracy scholars on new voter suppression as the
voting rights issue of our time misses a much larger disparity.
In Figure 2 we plot the relative disproportionality of turnout by income
quintiles. If turnout is equally distributed across all five income groups, then
each group would contribute 20% of the total votes. Instead, as the figure
illustrates, those in the poorest quintile contribute nearly five percentage
points (or 21%) less than expected to the overall vote, compared to those in
the wealthiest quintile who contribute three percentage points (or 15%) more
than expected. The large deviation between the highest and lowest income
quintile raises serious questions about whether income inequality in the
United States undermines the principle of one-person, one-vote.116 In
Reynolds v. Sims, the Supreme Court held that “[f]ull and effective
participation by all citizens in state government requires . . . that each citizen
have an equally effective voice in the election of members of his state
legislature.”117 In the context of apportionment and districting, the Court has,
as a rule of thumb, tolerated deviations between the most populous and least
populous state and local districts of up to 10%.118 Following the Court’s logic
in the malapportionment cases, the “income quintile deviation” (percentage
overrepresentation of the upper quintile minus the percentage
underrepresentation of the bottom quintile) is 36%, suggesting that the next
battle for the Reynolds ideal of an “equally effective voice” might be waged
over poverty and turnout.119 We also note that the “new voter suppression”

115 Ethan Kaplan, Election Law and Political Economy, ECON. FOR INCLUSIVE PROSPERITY 1
(Jan. 2019), https://econfip.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/5.Election-Law-and-Political-Economy.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GN9Y-J9NT] (“Those earning more than $150,000 per year vote at a 50% higher rate
in presidential elections and at a 100% higher rate in midterm elections than those making less than $5,000
per year.”).
116 The Supreme Court interpreted the Equal Protection Clause as a guarantee of the one-person, onevote standard in apportionment in a series of cases during the 1960s. See Avery v. Midland Cty., 390 U.S.
474, 484–85 (1968); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17–
18 (1964); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 391 (1963).
117 377 U.S. at 565 (emphasis added).
118 Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 842–43 (1983) (“Our decisions have established, as a general
matter, that an apportionment plan with a maximum population deviation under 10% falls within [a]
category of minor deviations. A plan with larger disparities in population, however, creates a prima facie
case of discrimination and therefore must be justified by the State.” (internal citations omitted)). While
the Court has required near perfect population equality in congressional districts, it presumptively accepts
deviations up to 10% in state and local districts due to their smaller district sizes, geographic constraints,
a commitment to compactness, contiguity, and enforcement of the Voting Rights Act. See id. at 842.
119 Note that the 36% “income quintile deviation” is much larger than deviations in turnout by race
(15%–16% less turnout among Hispanic, Black, and Asian voters compared to White voters) and
gender (7% less turnout among women). See Shiro Kuriwaki, Cumulative CCES Common Content
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does not account for this disparity. In fact, the income quintile deviation is
smaller in states with strict voter ID laws than in states with no strict ID laws.
If the new voter suppression only weakly (if at all) accounts for the
persistent turnout disparity between the rich and the poor, then what does
account for it? To answer this question, we need to move beyond the
theoretical approach to voting that is embedded in legal scholarship and
advocacy. In the next part, we use social scientists’ recent work to broaden
our understanding of the factors that drive voting and keep the poor away
from the polls.

Strict ID

No Strict ID

0.20

0.22

15%

0.18

Equal apportionment of votes

0.16

Proportion of overall vote

0.24

0.26

FIGURE 2: RELATIVE TURNOUT DISPROPORTIONS BY INCOMEb

0.14

−21%

< $20k

$20−30k

$30−50k

$50−70k

> $70k

b

Relative disproportionality in turnout by equally sized income quintiles and the status of voter ID laws
in the voter’s state. Source: Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) validated voter file (2006–
2016).

II. TOWARD A DEEPER THEORETICAL ACCOUNT OF VOTING
When it comes to voting barriers, a large disjuncture has emerged
between what legal experts target and what social scientists conclude
matters. A central focal point for legal scholars and lawyers is state-imposed
legal barriers to voting and their impact on racial minorities.120 Yet legal
experts have completely ignored the sources, or even the very existence, of
the effective disfranchisement of the poor. While social scientists devote

(2006–2018), HARV. DATAVERSE (Apr. 29,
[https://perma.cc/UTL9-UAYT].
120 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.

2019),

https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/II2DB6
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considerable energy to examining the effect of legal barriers on racial
minority voting,121 they also study impediments to voting that affect other
groups as well, such as the poor.122 Their broadened focus relies on theories
of voting that go beyond tangible obstacles like voter ID laws.
For social scientists informed by rational choice and sociological
theories of voting, voting depends on a panoply of factors beyond overt
barriers.123 Voters’ ability to access information and their connections to
other politically active individuals are much more central determinants of
voting than the tangible costs.124 In this Part, we provide a deeper theoretical
account of voting than typically advanced by legal scholars as a foundation
for a more nuanced understanding of the sources of disfranchisement. We
then relate these theories and their empirical implications to the effective
disfranchisement of the poor.
A. Rational Choice Theory
Voting is not a deeply theorized subject in law. When barriers to voting
fail to fully explain people’s decision not to vote, there is no alternative
theoretical account in legal scholarship or advocacy. Instead, legal scholars
and advocates cycle from one generation to the next of voting rights
challenges—from vote denial (the first generation of barriers) to vote
dilution (second generation) to election administration (third generation)—
without developing a full theoretical account explaining why people do or
do not vote.125 Understanding the decision to vote, we argue, is key to all
three generations of voting rights challenges, which all share the goal of a
more inclusive democracy.
Rational choice theory advances our understanding of the determinants
of voting beyond tangible costs. Legal scholars are certainly not oblivious to
rational choice theory. Anthony Downs, the principal progenitor of the
121

See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., BARTELS, supra note 6, at 260–65; GILENS, supra note 6; Kim Quaile Hill et al., LowerClass Mobilization and Policy Linkage in the U.S. States, 39 AM. J. POL. SCI. 75, 83 (1995) (finding a
“positive relationship between lower-class mobilization and state welfare policy”); Elizbeth Rigby &
Gerald C. Wright, Political Parties and Representation of the Poor in the American States, 57 AM. J.
POL. SCI. 552, 553 (2013) (examining the responsiveness of state political parties to the preferences of
individuals from varied income backgrounds during the initial stages of policymaking).
123 See infra notes 132–136 and accompanying text.
124 See infra note 137.
125
See, e.g., Gilda R. Daniels, A Vote Delayed Is a Vote Denied: A Preemptive Approach to
Eliminating Election Administration Legislation that Disenfranchises Unwanted Voters, 47 U.
LOUISVILLE L. REV. 57, 66–69 (2008); Brandon Haase, Guaranteeing the Right to Vote for Twenty-First
Century America, 43 J. LEGIS. 240, 244 (2016); Dale E. Ho, Building an Umbrella in a Rainstorm: The
New Vote Denial Litigation Since Shelby County, 127 YALE L.J.F. 799, 800–02 (2018); Daniel P. Tokaji,
The New Vote Denial: Where Election Reform Meets the New Voting Rights Act, 57 S.C. L. REV. 689,
691–92 (2006).
122
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theory, has been much cited and discussed in the legal literature.126 But when
it comes to voting, legal scholars tend to narrowly focus on the paradox of
voting that rational choice theorists have thus far failed to resolve within the
theory itself—the question of why anyone bothers to vote when the likely
impact of any individual vote on election outcomes is essentially nil.127
Rational choice posits three factors relevant to an individual’s decision
to invest, or vote: the benefits from voting, the costs to voting, and the
probability that the individual’s vote will be decisive in an election.128 In this
“calculus of voting,” even relatively trivial costs of voting, such as making a
trip to the polls—let alone the much higher information costs—are likely to
exceed any benefit from voting multiplied by the probability of casting a
decisive vote. It is therefore irrational for anyone to vote. And yet,
paradoxically, millions and millions of Americans vote in elections every
year.129
This paradox, and the lack of clear resolution of this paradox, has
contributed to legal scholars’ dismissive treatment of rational choice
theory.130 We argue, however, that legal scholars have been too quick to
dismiss the theory. Even if rational choice theory is unable to explain why
people vote in the first place, it provides important insights into voting
determinants on the margin. It may be that the baseline decision to vote is
motivated by factors that are inconsistent with the premises of the theory,
126 Anthony Downs’s seminal work from 1957 that serves as the starting point for rational choice
theory, An Economic Theory of Democracy, infra note 128, has been cited in some 796 law review articles
to date according to a Hein Online search.
127 See, e.g., Stephen Ansolabehere & Nathaniel Persily, Vote Fraud in the Eye of the Beholder: The
Role of Public Opinion in the Challenge to Voter Identification Requirements, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1737,
1752 & n.38 (2008) (citing Downs but narrowly focusing on the paradox of voting); Richard L. Hasen,
Voting Without Law?, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2135, 2138–42 (1996) (engaging in the most expansive analysis
of the paradox of voting in the legal literature); Jason Marisam, Voter Turnout: From Cost to
Cooperation, 21 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 190, 205–06 (2009) (describing the rational choice model and the
paradox of voting).
128 ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 38–45 (1957). In a later article,
William Riker and Professor Peter Ordeshook construct a calculus of voting that relates the three factors
in the following formula: R = PB – C. R is the return to the individual for voting (R) and this return is
derived from the probability of casting a decisive vote (P) multiplied by the investment benefit from
voting (B) minus the costs to voting (C). William H. Riker & Peter C. Ordeshook, A Theory of the
Calculus of Voting, 62 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 25, 25 (1968). A paradox arises from the fact that the
probability of casting a decisive vote in any large election is infinitesimally small. See Andrew Gelman
et al., What Is the Probability Your Vote Will Make a Difference?, 50 ECON. INQUIRY 321, 323–24 (2012)
(estimating that the probability of casting the pivotal vote in a presidential election (accounting for the
probability that one lives in a state whose Electoral College vote will be pivotal) is approximately 1 in 60
million, or “at most, 1 in 10 million in a few states near the national median”). As a result, the interaction
term (PB) will also be infinitesimally small.
129 See Timothy J. Feddersen, Rational Choice Theory and the Paradox of Not Voting, 18 J. ECON.
PERSP. 99, 99 (2004).
130 See, e.g., Hasen, supra note 127, at 2146 (“Rational choice theory seems best suited to explaining
voting on the margin only, by examining how changes in costs (the C term) affect turnout.”); Marisam,
supra note 127, at 205 (“The rational choice model holds limited predictive value for voter turnout.”).
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such as consumption benefits from voting related to satisfying a sense of
civic duty or the desire to maintain a democracy.131 But rational choice theory
can still contribute to our understanding of the sources of variation in turnout
that have been mostly overlooked in the legal literature. In particular, rational
choice theory identifies two voting determinants—information and formal
organizational affiliation—that, we argue later in this Part, are unevenly
distributed and help explain the socioeconomic class-based participatory
inequality that is the focal point of this Article.
One of the critical insights from rational choice theory is the importance
of information to voting.132 For example, Downs recognized uncertainty as a
central feature of the basic logic of voting, which affects all three variables
in the calculus of voting.133 First, uncertainty influences an individual’s
assessment of the benefits from voting. When looking backward, individuals
face uncertainty about what the incumbent, as part of the government, has
done or could be doing to increase their well-being.134 Individuals are also
uncertain about the differences between what candidates will do in the future
and how those differences might impact their well-being.135 Individuals
unable to differentiate between candidates in terms of their well-being should

131 See DOWNS, supra note 128, at 246 (arguing that the paradox of voting can be resolved once we
recognize that “rational citizens want democracy to work well so as to gain its benefits”). Riker &
Ordeshook, supra note 128, at 25, include terms to capture both investment value (utility derived from
contributing to the outcome of an election) and consumption value (utility derived from the act of voting
itself) in their calculus of voting, but do not develop a strong basis for distinguishing between the two.
More recent literature on the ethics of voting has developed a stronger theory about voting as an
expression of values and a signal of beliefs. See, e.g., GEOFFREY BRENNAN & LOREN LOMASKY,
DEMOCRACY AND DECISION: THE PURE THEORY OF ELECTORAL PREFERENCE 32–53 (1993) (establishing
a model of electoral behavior where voting is a primarily expressive act); Loren E. Lomasky & Geoffrey
Brennan, Is There a Duty to Vote?, 17 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 62, 82 (2000) (arguing that “[o]f all the
rationales for a duty to vote, we find the expressive account strongest”); Alexander A. Schuessler,
Expressive Voting, 12 RATIONALITY & SOC. 87, 90 (2000) (explaining how the utility from voting should
be conceptualized as “being versus doing”).
132 In addition to Anthony Downs, who focuses extensively on information as a critical determinant
of voting, see DOWNS, supra note 128, at 207–46, an information theory of voting has emerged as a
central component in the rational choice account of voting. See, e.g., Timothy J. Feddersen & Wolfgang
Pesendorfer, Abstention in Elections with Asymmetric Information and Diverse Preferences, 93 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 381, 381 (1999) (“We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for abstention and show how
the level of abstention depends upon the information environment.”); Timothy J. Feddersen & Wolfgang
Pesendorfer, The Swing Voter’s Curse, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 408, 409 (1996) (“Our contribution here is to
demonstrate that informational asymmetries may also influence both participation and vote choice
independent of costs to vote and pivot probabilities.”); John G. Matsusaka, Explaining Voter Turnout
Patterns: An Information Theory, 84 PUB. CHOICE 91, 93 (1995) (“The main insight of the model is that
even if people believe it is their duty to vote, rational citizens abstain if they feel unable to evaluate the
choices.”); Joseph McMurray, The Paradox of Information and Voter Turnout, 165 PUB. CHOICE 13, 15
(2015) (“[T]he empirical importance of information favors a view of voting somehow as instrumental,
rather than as an end in itself.”).
133 DOWNS, supra note 128, at 77–82.
134 Id. at 80.
135 Id.
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be less likely to vote because there would be no recognizable benefit from
voting.
Second, uncertainty also impacts individuals’ perceptions about their
probability of casting a decisive vote. While it is infinitesimally rare for any
individual to cast a decisive vote, studies have shown that individuals’
perceptions about the closeness of an election can influence their decisions
to vote.136 Those who do not know the closeness of the election may be less
likely to vote. Finally, uncertainty about the logistics of voting can also
influence the decision to vote. Individuals who are uncertain about where to
vote, how much time it will take to vote, when to vote, and what is required
in order to vote are less likely to vote.137
Information can reduce or even eliminate uncertainty about the benefits
of voting, perceptions about the closeness of elections, and the process of
voting. A stream of free (or close to free) and broadly available information
can dramatically reduce uncertainty about whether one’s vote might be
decisive. Television, radio, newspapers, and the Internet provide the public
with a broad sense of the anticipated closeness of elections.138 Such
information requires little processing time or background knowledge and is
therefore presumably more easily incorporated by individuals across all
classes into their calculus of voting.
136 For early research showing strong correlations between electoral competitiveness and turnout,
see generally ANGUS CAMPBELL ET AL., THE AMERICAN VOTER (1960); THOMAS R. DYE, POLITICS,
ECONOMICS, AND THE PUBLIC: POLICY OUTCOMES IN THE AMERICAN STATES (Aaron Wildavsky ed.,
1966); WILLIAM H. FLANIGAN, POLITICAL BEHAVIOR OF THE AMERICAN ELECTORATE 34–36 (2d ed.
1972); Lester W. Milbrath, Individuals and Government, in POLITICS IN THE AMERICAN STATES: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 27 (Herbert Jacob & Kenneth N. Vines eds., 2d ed. 1971).
More recent studies note that the correlation between turnout and competitive elections is strongest
in single-member districts, Daniel Stockemer, When Do Close Elections Matter for Higher Turnout?
Gauging the Impact of the Interaction Between Electoral Competitiveness and District Magnitude, 25 J.
ELECTIONS PUB. OPINION & PARTIES 178, 190 (2015), and when voters perceive elections to be close,
Leonardo Bursztyn et al., Polls, the Press, and Political Participation: The Effects of Anticipated Election
Closeness on Voter Turnout 5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23490, 2018) (“We
find that greater exposure to only the incidental reporting on close polls is associated with greater turnout
as well.”).
Increased mobilization may also drive turnout in close elections. See generally Gary W. Cox &
Michael C. Munger, Closeness, Expenditures, and Turnout in the 1982 U.S. House Elections, 83 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 217 (1989).
137 See Henry E. Brady & John E. McNulty, Turning Out to Vote: The Costs of Finding and Getting
to the Polling Place, 105 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 115, 116 (2011) (finding that turnout decreased when
polling places were moved, and that “the impact of the search effect is about two and one-half times larger
than the transportation effect”); see also Jesse Yoder, How Polling Place Changes Reduce Turnout:
Evidence from Administrative Data in North Carolina 16 (May 30, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/
a=3178184 [https://perma.cc/DG3E-SF2Z] (finding that turnout decreases when polling places are moved
to new locations, and that “the majority of the decline in turnout induced by polling place changes can be
attributed to the search costs associated with finding a new polling place rather than travel costs”).
138 See John H. Aldrich, Rational Choice and Turnout, 37 AM. J. POL. SCI. 246, 260 (1993)
(explaining that there is typically “a lot of information about the expected closeness of two-candidate
presidential elections, and it is relatively easy to process that information”).
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When it comes to the costs of voting, the same sources provide mostly
free information about when to vote, but not necessarily how, where, and
what is required to vote. Parties and nonprofit groups’ get-out-the-vote
(GOTV) efforts serve as important vehicles for filling this information gap
through mailings, phone calls, and door-to-door canvassing.139 As with
information about the closeness of the election, such logistical information
necessitates little processing time or background knowledge. As a result, to
the extent that individuals receive such information, they are able to build
more certainty about the costs of voting into their voting calculus and, in
doing so, will often see these costs as quite low.
The biggest informational challenge for individuals comes in assessing
the tangible benefits from voting. To do so, they must have a sense of the
differences between candidates and parties and how these differences might
impact their well-being.140 In a perfect world with costless information,
Downs explains, the potential voter would first need to “examine all phases
of government action to find out where the two parties would behave
differently.”141 Second, she would need to “discover how each difference
would affect h[er] utility income.”142 And third, she would have to “aggregate
the differences in utility and arrive at a net figure which shows by how much
one party would be better than the other.”143 These are enormous
informational requirements for any individual. Because we do not live in a
world of costless information, most voters take shortcuts to ascertain party
differentials.144 But even these shortcuts, which might involve comparing
139 See, e.g., Sample Get-Out-the-Vote Email and Phone Scripts, LEAGUE WOMEN VOTERS,
https://www.lwv.org/league-management/elections-tools/sample-get-out-vote-email-and-phone-scripts
[https://perma.cc/H93Q-YQNJ] (providing contacted persons with logistical information about voting).
140 Seven years prior to the publication of DOWNS, supra note 128, the American Political Science
Association published the findings of a four-year study by the organization’s Committee on Political
Parties. The Committee argued that the platforms of the Democratic and Republican parties were so
similar that voters could not distinguish between them. See Committee on Pol. Parties, Am. Pol. Sci.
Ass’n, Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System: A Report of the Committee on Political Parties,
44 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1, 3–4 (1950) (“Alternatives between the parties are defined so badly that it is
often difficult to determine what the election has decided even in broadest terms.”). More recent literature
suggests that modern partisan polarization has both increased turnout, see Alan I. Abramowitz & Walter
J. Stone, The Bush Effect: Polarization, Turnout, and Activism in the 2004 Presidential Election, 36 PRES.
STUD. Q. 141, 142 (2006) (finding that George W. Bush was “the most polarizing presidential candidate
in recent political history and that this was the main reason turnout and activism increased dramatically
in 2004”), and increased more informed voting, see Douglas R. Pierce & Richard R. Lau, Polarization
and Correct Voting in U.S. Presidential Elections, 60 ELECTORAL STUD. 1, 9 (2019) (finding that
“polarization contributes to our democracy by increasing the likelihood that people vote correctly”).
141 DOWNS, supra note 128, at 45.
142 Id. Utility income refers to the benefits of voting, or the satisfaction of choosing one particular
candidate/party over another.
143 Id.
144 See, e.g., Elizabeth Garrett, Voting with Cues, 37 U. RICH. L. REV. 1011, 1023–24 (2003)
(“Political scientists and cognitive psychologists have worked to identify the shortcuts or heuristics that
ordinary citizens can use to vote competently, that is, to vote with limited information as they would if
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candidates’ policy platforms, public positions, or personal backgrounds,
require a nontrivial amount of information, not to mention the time and
capacity to process such information.145
There is both indirect and direct empirical evidence suggesting the
importance of information to voting decisions. The indirect evidence arises
from the strong correlation between educational attainment and voting,
which makes sense from the perspective of rational choice theory.146
Education generally enhances the capacity of individuals to process
information. And, in some cases, education provides individuals with greater
background knowledge about policy and politics which makes it easier to
ascertain the candidate or party differentials critical to determining the
benefits from voting.147
More direct evidence can be found in correlational studies, finding a
relationship between information and voting, and in experimental studies,

they had full information.”); Martin Gilens & Naomi Murakawa, Elite Cues and Political Decision
Making, 6 RES. IN MICROPOLITICS 15, 42 (2002) (“But decision-making heuristics seem to offer a less
demanding alternative by which citizens can form meaningful policy preferences.”); Michael S. Kang,
Democratizing Direct Democracy: Restoring Voter Competence Through Heuristic Cues and
“Disclosure Plus,” 50 UCLA L. Rev. 1141, 1150 (2003) (“Political scientists have shown that when
deciding for whom to vote in candidate elections, the typical voter refers to the heuristic cue of party
identification to figure out which candidate is most likely to match her values and share her interests.”).
145 Shortcuts may also be less reliable in state and local elections. See Christopher S. Elmendorf &
David Schleicher, Informing Consent: Voter Ignorance, Political Parties, and Election Law, 2013 U. ILL.
L. REV. 363, 367 (arguing that traditional heuristics may be ineffective at the state and local level “not
simply because voters pay less attention to these elections. It is also because our system of election law
does not provide voters in these elections with on-ballot voting cues of comparable quality to the party
labels used in national elections.”).
146 See, e.g., RAYMOND E. WOLFINGER & STEVEN J. ROSENSTONE, WHO VOTES? 34 (1980) (finding
in their seminal study that “[c]itizens with a college degree are 38 percent more likely to vote than are
people with fewer than five years of schooling”).
Subsequent studies have found similarly strong correlations between educational attainment and
turnout. See, e.g., Thomas S. Dee, Are There Civic Returns to Education?, 88 J. PUB. ECON. 1697, 1704
(2004) (estimating that college entrance increases the probability of voting in the last year by 26%); KarlOskar Lindgren et al., Enhancing Electoral Equality: Can Education Compensate for Family Background
Differences in Voting Participation?, 113 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 108, 120 (2019) (finding after studying
Swedish education reforms of the 1990s that increased education has a particularly strong effect on the
turnout of students from lower socioeconomic backgrounds); Alexander K. Mayer, Does Education
Increase Political Participation?, 73 J. POL. 633, 640 (2011) (estimating that postsecondary education
advancement increases turnout by 18%); Kevin Milligan et al., Does Education Improve Citizenship?
Evidence from the United States and the United Kingdom, 88 J. PUB. ECON. 1667, 1678–81 (2004)
(finding that U.S. high school graduates are 25.6% more likely to vote after controlling for race, gender,
and birth effects and that exogenous increases in (compulsory) education increased turnout).
147
See, e.g., SIDNEY VERBA ET AL., VOICE AND EQUALITY: CIVIC VOLUNTARISM IN AMERICAN
POLITICS 514 (1995) (“Educated citizens are much more likely to be informed about politics and tolerant
of unpopular opinions.”); Ronald La Due Lake & Robert Huckfeldt, Social Capital, Social Networks, and
Political Participation, 19 POL. PSYCHOL. 567, 568 (1998) (“Well-educated citizens are more likely to
possess a knowledge base that makes it easier to unravel the intricacies of the political process, and they
are more likely to possess the cognitive skills that make it easier to absorb and process complex political
information.”).
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suggesting a causal effect of information on voting.148 The findings from
these studies are consistent with a general observation that turnout is much
higher in higher information elections (such as presidential elections) than in
lower information elections (such as city council elections), even though the
probability that an individual could cast a decisive vote is much higher in the
latter than the former (precisely because turnout is so low).149 It is difficult to
disentangle whether and to what degree information about the costs,
perception of electoral closeness, or the benefits from electing a candidate is
driving the decision to vote. But it seems clear that information matters quite
a bit to the voting calculus. Thus, understanding how information is
distributed can provide an important key to understanding turnout variations
between groups.
Within rational choice theory, a second source of turnout variation can
be derived from the context in which voters operate, including the formal
organizations to which people belong.150 If we understand elections to be
contests between formal organizations or groups rather than atomistic
individuals, then the rational choice calculus of voting might predict positive

148 See, e.g., Valentino Larcinese, Does Political Knowledge Increase Turnout? Evidence from the
1997 British General Election, 131 PUB. CHOICE 387, 405 (2007) (finding that information is not only “a
good predictor of turnout, but also that it raises voter participation in a clearly causal fashion”); David
Dreyer Lassen, The Effect of Information on Voter Turnout: Evidence from a Natural Experiment, 49 AM.
J. POL. SCI. 103, 113 (2005) (finding a 20% average treatment effect of being informed on the propensity
to vote); Thomas R. Palfrey & Keith T. Poole, The Relationship Between Information, Ideology, and
Voting Behavior, 31 AM. J. POL. SCI. 511, 526 (1987) (finding a positive relationship between the level
of information that an individual holds and the probability of voting); Martin P. Wattenberg et al., How
Voting Is like an SAT Test: An Analysis of American Voter Rolloff, 28 AM. POL. Q. 234, 246–47 (2000)
(showing that voters’ lack of information in lower ballot races to be the most statistically significant
variable predicting “rolloff,” or the non-completion of a ballot).
149 Compare e.g., Voter Turnout, U.S. ELECTION PROJ., http://www.electproject.org/home/voterturnout/voter-turnout-data [https://perma.cc/2TWQ-24TQ] (offering nationwide voter turnout data and
finding approximately 60% of the voting eligible population has voted in presidential-year general
elections since 2004), with Official Total of Central and Polling Place Results, CITY HARTFORD,
http://www.hartford.gov/images/registrar/hartford_results_2013.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UL5C-DG9K]
(reporting less than 5% of Hartford, Connecticut’s population voted in the 2013 school board election),
and Erik Bojnansky, What If They Held an Election and Nobody Came?, BISCAYNE TIMES (Dec. 2013),
http://www.biscaynetimes.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1647
[https://perma.cc/SK5A-GCAA] (reporting turnout was less than 11% in a runoff election for District 5
of the Miami City Council in 2013), and In Iowa, a Special Election Has Historic Low Turnout, NPR
(Aug. 7, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/08/07/541969289/in-iowa-a-special-election-has-historiclow-turnout [https://perma.cc/RZH6-PQ3U] (reporting not a single person voted in the 2017 special
election in McIntyre, Iowa to decide the term length of the mayor and city council).
150 Rebecca B. Morton, Groups in Rational Turnout Models, 35 AM. J. POL. SCI. 758 (1991); Carole
Jean Uhlaner, Political Participation, Rational Actors, and Rationality: A New Approach, 7 POL.
PSYCHOL. 551 (1986) [hereinafter Uhlaner, Political Participation]; Carole J. Uhlaner, Rational Turnout:
The Neglected Role of Groups, 33 AM. J. POL. SCI. 390 (1989) [hereinafter Uhlaner, Rational Turnout];
Carole Jean Uhlaner, “Relational Goods” and Participation: Incorporating Sociability into a Theory of
Rational Action, 62 PUB. CHOICE 253 (1989) [hereinafter Uhlaner, Relational Goods].
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turnout.151 Since there are many fewer groups than individuals, the
probability that a group of individuals will cast a decisive vote is no longer
infinitesimal and, depending on the election and how many groups are
actively involved, the probability could actually be quite high.
Group leaders further incentivize group members to vote in three ways.
First, groups inform their members of the benefits from voting by showing
how the candidates differ and how these differences relate to the group’s
(and therefore its members’) utility incomes.152 Second, group leaders
provide their members with selective benefits for voting, such as the
satisfaction of sharing an identity with others.153 And third, group leaders can
create a sense that there is a duty as a member of the group to vote.154 Group
leaders can then leverage the potential voting power of the group to secure
policy concessions from candidates that will bring their policy platforms
closer to the group’s preferences.155
This group-based variation of rational choice theory thus introduces the
possibility that individuals might vary in the intangible benefits they derive
from voting, such as satisfying the sense of duty to vote. Prior rational choice
scholars had only identified such benefits as an explanation for why people
might vote even when the calculus of voting suggested it would be
irrational.156 However, they never assessed whether and why those benefits
from voting might be unevenly distributed. If the sense of duty to vote makes
a person more likely to vote, then the uneven distribution of that potential
benefit will contribute to variations in turnout. Political scientists have
argued that these variations might not be random, but rather the product of
differences in formal organizational affiliations that are correlated with one’s
class status.157

151 See Uhlaner, Political Participation, supra note 150, at 565 (“Although the vote of any one group
member could rarely change an election outcome, the votes of many members well might.”); Uhlaner,
Rational Turnout, supra note 150, at 419 (“[I]ndividuals do not behave atomistically within the political
sphere but rather are joined with others in groups with shared interests.”).
152 See Jan Leighley, Group Membership and the Mobilization of Political Participation, 58 J. POL.
447, 447 (1996) (“Organizations . . . subsidize the costs of political information for members and may
therefore promote broader involvement in the political system.”).
153 Uhlaner, Political Participation, supra note 150, at 562. Professor Uhlaner refers to goods derived
from belonging to a group as relational goods. These goods, which include “‘social approval,’ solidarity,
a ‘desire to experience one’s history,’ friendship and its benefits, the desire to be recognized or accepted
by others, the desire to maintain an identity, other aspects of sociability, and some instances of fulfillment
of a duty or moral norm,” can positively influence an individual’s turnout decision. Uhlaner, Relational
Goods, supra note 150, at 255 (internal citations and footnotes omitted).
154 Uhlaner, Political Participation, supra note 150, at 562.
155 Id. at 560.
156 See sources cited supra note 131.
157 See infra notes 173–175 and accompanying text.
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Some empirical evidence supports the group-based rational choice
model. For example, those who belong to formal organizations like unions
are approximately 8% more likely to vote than nonmembers,158 and those
who attend church are approximately 15% more likely to vote than those
who do not.159 Studies thus far have failed to clearly identify the mechanism
driving this variation. The positive relationship between turnout and formal
organizational affiliation could be explained by voters’ greater ability to
obtain information, selective benefits, or an enhanced sense of duty from
such groups. Alternatively, it might be explained by other characteristics of
the individuals that belong to these organizations that are not accounted for
in empirical studies.
In sum, it may be that rational choice theory cannot provide a persuasive
explanation for why people vote at all. But it offers potentially helpful clues
for why some people might vote more than others by extending its focus
beyond the tangible costs of voting that occupy the legal literature. Empirical
evidence suggests that variations in the possession and capacity to process
information contribute to variations in voting. While the empirical evidence
for the group-based rational choice model is not yet as robust, that model
introduces variations in the intangible benefits from voting as another
plausible account for why some people vote more than others.
B. Sociological Theories of Voting
Legal scholars have only engaged shallowly with rational choice
theories; their engagement with sociological theories of voting is even more
slight.160 As with the rational choice theories of voting, the tangible costs of
voting that are central to legal voting rights claims are a relatively
158 See John Thomas Delaney et al., Unionism and Voter Turnout, 9 J. LAB. RES. 221, 230 (1988)
(reporting turnout is 8.3% higher among union members than nonmembers); Richard B. Freeman, What
Do Unions Do . . . To Voting?, 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9992, 2003)
(finding that turnout is 10 to 13 points higher among union members than nonmembers, though the
difference shrinks to about 4% when controlling for demographic characteristics of union members).
159 Alan S. Gerber et al., Does Church Attendance Cause People to Vote? Using Blue Laws’ Repeal
to Estimate the Effect of Religiosity on Voter Turnout, 46 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 481, 481 (2016) (“[T]hose
who report attending church weekly are between 10 and 15 percentage points more likely to vote.”); see
also STEVEN J. ROSENSTONE & JOHN MARK HANSEN, MOBILIZATION, PARTICIPATION, AND
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, 273–75 tbl.D-1 (1993) (using ANES data to measure turnout among
churchgoers, controlling for various demographic and geographic variables); SIDNEY VERBA ET AL.,
supra note 147 (presenting similar results using both ANES data and responses to the 1990 Citizen
Participation Survey).
160
Professor Richard Hasen is the one scholar we found in the law review literature that gave deep
and sustained attention to sociological theories of voting in an article he wrote over twenty years ago. See
generally Hasen, supra note 127. The foundational books for the sociological theory of voting from the
mid-twentieth century, Voting and The People’s Choice, have been cited by 123 and 120 law review
articles, respectively. BERNARD R. BERELSON ET AL., VOTING: A STUDY OF OPINION FORMATION IN A
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN (1954); PAUL F. LAZARSFELD ET AL., THE PEOPLE’S CHOICE: HOW THE VOTER
MAKES UP HIS MIND IN A PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN (3d ed. 1968).
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unimportant voting determinant under the sociological theories of voting. 161
But unlike rational choice theories of voting, the sociological theories do not
view voting as an individualistic decision.162 Sociologists instead emphasize
the interdependent nature of the decision to vote. The central determinants
of voting in the sociological theories are the social networks to which the
individual belongs, which are rooted in the social context surrounding the
individual.
In the 1940s and 1950s, sociologists from the Columbia School of
Sociology initiated two in-depth studies of voting behavior that were among
the first to ever be conducted. Both found that voting is a social decision. In
The People’s Choice, the authors of a study of Erie County, Ohio, residents’
voting behavior concluded that “voting is essentially a group experience.
People who work or live or play together are likely to vote for the same
candidates.”163 In Voting, a study of voting behavior in Elmira, New York,
the sociologists came to a similar conclusion, explaining that “[t]he
individual’s vote is the product of a number of social conditions or
influences.”164 They found that the groups that matter to individuals’ vote
choices include the family, socioeconomic and ethnic affiliations, personal
associations, and formal membership associations.165 Such social networks
influence vote choice through internal communications about politics and
their members’ reliance on the opinions and vote choices of others,
particularly opinion leaders, within the network.166
Later sociological work drawing from these early studies theorized that
social networks not only influence how one votes, but also the very decision
161 Most sociological theories do not incorporate the tangible costs of voting into their models. The
one exception is a recent study by Professor Meredith Rolfe, who treated institutional costs as a factor of
secondary relevance in her model. MEREDITH ROLFE, VOTER TURNOUT: A SOCIAL THEORY OF
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 101–06 (2012) (advancing a conditional voting decision model in which the
individual turnout decision depends on social context and offering a theory of socially interdependent
voting behavior).
162 See SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, POLITICAL MAN: THE SOCIAL BASES OF POLITICS 200 (1960)
(“Even if people are not aware of a personal stake in the electoral decision, they may still be induced to
vote by social pressures and inner feelings of social obligation.”); Katherine Haenschen, Social Pressure
on Social Media: Using Facebook Status Updates to Increase Voter Turnout, 66 J. COMM. 542, 558
(2016) (arguing that personal networks create a “flow of voter action, not just information”); R. Robert
Huckfeldt, Political Participation and the Neighborhood Social Context, 23 AM. J. POL. SCI. 579 (1979)
(discussing the connection between higher social status and greater political participation); David Knoke,
Networks of Political Action: Toward Theory Construction, 68 SOC. FORCES 1041, 1054 (1990) (“[T]he
more often people discuss politics with their intimates, the more they participate in the various electoral
activities.”); Jan E. Leighley, Social Interaction and Contextual Influences on Political Participation,
18 AM. POL. Q. 459, 472 (1990) (“[A]ggregate measures of social context as well as characteristics of
individuals’ social interaction influence their likelihood of participation.”).
163 LAZARSFELD ET AL., supra note 160, at 137.
164 BERELSON ET AL., supra note 160, at 37.
165 Id. at 46–52, 88–98.
166 Id. at 102–08.
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to vote.167 Within social networks, political information that is relevant to the
decision to vote is shared.168 Social networks also construct norms about
voting that can be enforced through social sanctions.169
Sociologists have found that variations in turnout are related to
differences in the composition of social networks. On the one hand, social
networks comprising politically interested individuals will share political
information with each other and construct group norms that voting is a social
obligation or a civic duty.170 Individuals in these networks seeking to avoid
social disapproval, or even ostracization, are thought to engage in imitative
behavior, leading to turnout cascades within social networks.171
On the other hand, social networks comprising individuals who are
indifferent to politics or worse might construct a norm of nonvoting that
leads to social disapproval or ostracization for those who do vote. The result
is abstention cascades in which imitative behavior within the social networks
contributes to the widespread abstention of members in the network.172
The composition of social networks, and particularly the extent to
which they include politically interested people, has been found to be related
to the individual’s social and neighborhood context.173 Family, friends,
coworkers, neighbors, and comembers of associations like unions or
churches are the primary components of networks. These networks tend to
be characterized by high degrees of homophily on a broad array of
167

See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
Scott D. McClurg, Social Networks and Political Participation: The Role of Social Interaction in
Explaining Political Participation, 56 POL. RES. Q. 449, 450 (2003) (advancing the social network model
of participation in which information is shared between members of the social network).
169 See e.g., Stephen Knack, Civic Norms, Social Sanctions, and Voter Turnout, 4 RATIONALITY &
SOC’Y 133, 137–38 (1992) (“Social sanctions . . . permit a certain amount of ‘substitutability’ of feelings
of duty, as someone with a low sense of civic obligation may nonetheless vote to avoid displeasing a
friend or relative with a stronger sense of [civic] duty.”).
170 See, e.g., La Due Lake & Huckfeldt, supra note 147, at 579 (finding a positive relationship
between political expertise in a network and the likelihood of political participation and between the
frequency of political interaction within the network and the likelihood of participation).
171 See James H. Fowler, Turnout in a Small World, in THE SOCIAL LOGIC OF POLITICS: PERSONAL
NETWORKS AS CONTEXTS FOR POLITICAL BEHAVIOR 269, 270–72 (Alan S. Zuckerman ed., 2005).
172 Id. at 272. Another feature of social networks found to influence turnout decisions is the partisan
heterogeneity of the network; the more that persons within the network have differing political views, the
less likely that members of the network vote. Diana C. Mutz, The Consequences of Cross-Cutting
Networks for Political Participation, 46 AM. J. POL. SCI. 838, 844 (2002).
173 See Robert Huckfeldt & John Sprague, Discussant Effects on Vote Choice: Intimacy, Structure,
and Interdependence, 53 J. POL. 122, 123 (1991) (“[T]he family has been widely recognized as a
preeminent agent of social influence with long-lasting political consequences.”); Huckfeldt, supra note
162, at 589–90 (finding “that the neighborhood social context can influence both (1) the extent of the
individual participation and (2) the relationship between participation and individual social status”);
Bruce C. Straits, The Social Context of Voter Turnout, 54 PUB. OPINION Q. 64, 64 (1990) (“A voter’s
family, friends, and coworkers serve as bridges to larger networks of social relations which provide access
to the information and resources that stimulate political interest and provide an informed basis for making
ballot choices.” (citation omitted)).
168
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sociodemographic characteristics related to the propensity to vote.174 That
internal similarity, to the extent that it manifests in similar voting patterns
among demographically similar communities, in turn leads to substantial
turnout gaps between particular communities.175
C. Theories of Voting and Socioeconomic Class Turnout Disparities
Rational choice and sociological theories of voting introduce additional
determinants of voting that have been mostly overlooked in the legal
literature. Once we add information costs, membership in formal
organizations, and inclusion within social networks of politically interested
individuals as determinants of voting, a more plausible account of the turnout
disparity between the rich and poor emerges.
First, the costs of obtaining the information necessary to ascertain the
benefits from voting are not evenly distributed across socioeconomic classes.
Educational attainment, which tends to enhance the cognitive skills
necessary to process and use information relevant to determining the benefits
from voting, is positively correlated with income.176 Higher economic status
individuals tend to be better educated and therefore typically better able to
ascertain the benefits from voting than lower economic status individuals.177
The need for, and the cost of, information thus contributes to socioeconomic
class disparities in turnout.
Second, class-based differences in formal organizational affiliation are
another likely contributor to class-based turnout disparities. Formal
organizational affiliation positively influences turnout, and the poor belong
to fewer such organizations than other socioeconomic classes.178 As a result,
the poor are less likely than others to receive information from formal
organizational group leaders about the benefits from voting, selective
economic benefits to voting, or intangible benefits such as a sense of duty to
vote that can arise from such affiliations.

174 See Miller McPherson et al., Birds of a Feather: Homophily in Social Networks, 27 ANN. REV.
SOC. 415, 431–33 (2001).
175 See McClurg, supra note 168, at 451 (attributing the socioeconomic-based participation gap to
the differences in the social resources and social networks of low and high status communities).
176 See, e.g., David Card, The Causal Effect of Education on Earnings, in 3A HANDBOOK OF LABOR
ECONOMICS 1801, 1809 (Orley Ashenfelter & David Card eds., 1999) (reviewing empirical studies and
finding a consistent and positive effect of education on earnings).
177 See, e.g., Lassen, supra note 148, at 114 (“[T]he finding that education increases the probability
of being informed suggests that education may influence voting indirectly, possibly by lowering the costs
of information processing.”).
178 See La Due Lake & Huckfeldt, supra note 147, at 575 (finding from a regression of organizational
membership on demographic characteristics that “[a]s people earn more income, attain higher levels of
education, become employed, and get older, they report joining more organizations”).
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Differences in the composition of social networks are a third contributor
to socioeconomic turnout disparities that has been overlooked in law. The
poor vote less and, due to the sociodemographic homophily of social
networks, they are more likely to be part of social networks with other people
who vote less and have little interest in politics.179 Abstention cascades, rather
than turnout cascades, are therefore more likely to be a feature of the poor’s
social networks.
Empirical findings provide strong suggestive evidence that it is the
aggregation of these three determinants of voting—information costs, formal
organizational affiliation, and social networks—and not the tangible costs of
voting that explain much of the income-class based disparities in voting.180
The question then arises: What can be done to reduce such disparities? In the
next Part, we first acknowledge the likely limits of law in responding to
social and class-based sources of disparities. We then turn to another
contributing factor, the mobilization activities of political parties. At present,
campaigns exacerbate the political exclusion of the poor through what we
label passive voter suppression. That offers another potential route for law’s
interventions: changing campaigns’ incentives regarding mobilization.
III. UNDERSTANDING PASSIVE VOTER SUPPRESSION
When tangible cost barriers are the primary source of turnout
disparities, law provides a clear solution. Most tangible barriers, such as
registration or voting requirements, are state creations and can therefore be
eliminated or ameliorated by legislatures or courts. But when the primary
sources of turnout disparities are information costs, formal organizational
affiliations, and the composition of social networks, then the potential legal
interventions are either less readily identifiable or not politically viable,
given the massive resources required.
But another dynamic is at work, which can be addressed through law.
Candidate and party mobilization activities are centrally important factors
contributing to socioeconomic class-based turnout disparities. In this Part,
we examine how campaign mobilization activities interact with the three
determinants of voting identified in social science theories to increase (and
decrease) turnout. We then show how candidates and parties, using a
calculus of contact to guide their mobilization activities, ignore the poor and

179 Id. at 576 (finding a relationship between education and belonging to social networks of
politically well-informed and interested individuals).
180 See, e.g., Samuel Abrams et al., Informal Social Networks and Rational Voting, 41 BRIT. J. POL.
SCI. 229, 237–40, 252–56 (2010) (advancing a social network model explaining various determinants of
voting including income, education, student status, and age and providing empirical support for the
model).
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exacerbate socioeconomic turnout disparities, a phenomenon we label
passive voter suppression.
A. Political Mobilization and the Theories of Voting
The political information necessary to reduce uncertainty about the
benefits from voting is generally free. But such information differs in its
accessibility and tailoring. Examples of broadly accessible free political
information include campaign advertisements, television, and radio news.181
These sources provide information, sometimes detailed information, about
the candidates, their backgrounds, and their views on certain issues. The
problem is that such sources of information are not usually tailored to a
particular audience, which can make it difficult for potential voters to draw
connections between the candidates’ policies and platforms and their own
well-being.
Political information obtained from members of social networks and
formal organizations is both free and more tailored to the audience.182 When
family, friends, coworkers, or members of associations discuss politics, they
are more likely to discuss candidates, issues, and policies that are of interest
to each other.183 Through these political conversations, members of social
networks and formal organizations can obtain more tailored information
conducive to differentiating between parties and candidates on matters
relevant to the potential voters’ well-being. Such tailored information
reduces both the cognitive skills and the time necessary for individuals to
differentiate between parties and candidates and connect these differences to
their own lives.184

181

Although we note that campaigns are increasingly advertising on internet platforms, such as
Facebook, YouTube, and email blasts, this natural migration to online undermines the “free”
and “accessible” nature of many campaign advertisements because access to the Internet is stratified
by socioeconomic status. See Andrew Perrin & Maeve Duggan, Pew Res. Ctr., Americans’ Internet
Access: 2000–2015, PEW RES. CTR. 6 (June 26, 2015), https://www.pewinternet.org/wpcontent/uploads/sites/9/2015/06/2015-06-26_internet-usage-across-demographics-discover_FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GJ7G-AL7J] (“Adults living in households with an annual income of at least $75,000 a
year are the most likely to use the internet, with 97% of adults in this group currently reporting they are
internet users. Those living in households with an annual income under $30,000 a year are less likely to
report internet usage, with 74% of adults doing so now . . . [, and] . . . [t]hose with college educations are
more likely than those who do not have high school diplomas to use the internet.”).
182 See ROBERT HUCKFELDT & JOHN SPRAGUE, CITIZENS, POLITICS, AND SOCIAL COMMUNICATION:
INFORMATION AND INFLUENCE IN AN ELECTION CAMPAIGN 14 (1995) (noting that socially obtained
information is more efficient because it “comes tailor-made”).
183 See id. (“If a citizen wants to know about the current status of nuclear arms-reductions talks, he
may or may not find relevant information in the newspaper or on the television news, but he can formulate
an explicit informational request to an associate who might know.”).
184 See id. (explaining that citizens in a social network “can request information from people who,
based on their joint history in some common context, are known to have general viewpoints similar to
their own”).
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This tailored, free information is only accessible to members of social
networks and formal organizations. Those who either are in social networks
with little political activity or who are unaffiliated with politically active
formal associations tend to receive less tailored political information.185
These individuals often must resort to the free information, like the media,
that require greater cognitive skills and time to process and use.
Campaigns offer another free source of information that can be tailored
to the potential voter. During election season, campaigns reach potential
voters by sending mailers, calling, and meeting in person through door-todoor canvassing. Their goal is to mobilize individuals to vote for their
candidate and they often do so by providing individuals with information
about the candidate and her positions.186 The most effective campaigns gather
information about individuals and seek to tailor information about the
candidate and positions in a way that draws a connection between supporting
the candidate and improving the contacted individuals’ lives.187 In doing so,
campaigns subsidize information costs by reducing the cognitive skills and
time necessary to process and use information necessary to differentiate
between candidates and otherwise determine the benefits from voting.188
Campaigns also indirectly provide tailored information to individuals
they do not directly contact. They do so by providing leaders and members
of formal organizations and social networks with tailored political
information that they can share with other members of those organizations
and networks.189 Sharing such information allows members to make more
educated determinations about the differences between the candidates and
how these differences might affect them.

185 Campaigns are perhaps the important source of tailored information as they tend to focus few
mobilization resources on individuals outside of politically relevant social networks and politically active
formal associations. See infra Section III.D.
186 See Robert Huckfeldt & John Sprague, Political Parties and Electoral Mobilization: Political
Structure, Social Structure, and the Party Canvass, 86 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 70, 70 (1992) (“When a party
worker knocks on a citizen’s door, calls a citizen on the telephone, or affronts him with a yard sign, an
effort is being made by one individual to provide information that will influence the behavior of another
individual.”).
187 See Kyle Endres & Kristin J. Kelly, Does Microtargeting Matter? Campaign Contact Strategies
and Young Voters, 28 J. ELECTIONS PUB. OPINION & PARTIES 1, 4 (2017) (“Campaigns use data about
the individual to deliver messages to the segments of the electorate who are thought to be the most
receptive to their outreach based on their perceived partisanship and perceived issue positions.”).
188 Kevin Arceneaux, Do Campaigns Help Voters Learn? A Cross-National Analysis, 36 BRIT. J.
POL. SCI. 159, 160–61 (2006) (arguing that campaign information does not persuade voters to change
their minds but helps them make decisions in line with their beliefs).
189 HUCKFELDT & SPRAGUE, supra note 182, at 22 (“[P]artisan organizations heighten and extend
the impact of the information they convey by carefully targeting their messages to particular locations
within the social structure—locations that are likely to further the diffusion of their messages.”).
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Beyond information, both the rational choice and sociological theories
point to a sense of duty as a determinant of voting.190 This sense of duty can
arise from affiliation with formal organizations and the desire for social
rewards or the fear of social sanctions that are associated with individuals’
voting decisions.191 The sense of duty can also emanate from social networks
where norms, imitative behavior, and a yearning to belong influence
individuals’ voting decisions.192 Through their mobilization activities,
campaigns can also convey to individuals, formal organizational leaders, and
members of social networks that voting is an important civic responsibility.
This sense of duty is often transmitted from organizational leaders to other
members, as well as from one member of a social network to another.193
Unfortunately, while the political information and sense of duty that
campaigns provide directly to individuals and indirectly through formal
organizations and social networks is free, it is not broadly accessible.
Campaigns do not have the resources or inclination to contact everyone.
Instead, what we label a calculus of contact leads to disparities in the
distribution of tailored information. The resulting gaps have socioeconomic
class dimensions and drive what we identify as passive voter suppression. In
the rest of this Part, we elaborate on these points. But first, we contextualize
the rising importance of campaign mobilization activities as a means to
inform voters and provide them with a sense of duty to vote.
B. The Rising Importance of Campaign Mobilization Activities
The primary goal of campaigns is to win elections. Campaigns employ
multifaceted strategies to secure the votes necessary to win elections. These
strategies often involve some combination of encouraging supporters to go
to the polls, persuading undecided individuals to vote favorably for the
candidate, and discouraging opponents from turning out to vote.194 In
deciding which strategy to pursue and the proper mix of the strategies,
campaigns need to consider the costs and effectiveness of each.195

190

See Uhlaner, Political Participation, supra note 150, at 562 and accompanying text.
See supra note 170.
192 See supra notes 154, 170 and accompanying text.
193 See Uhlaner, Rational Turnout, supra note 150, at 391–92 (describing leaders of formal
organizations as intermediaries between politicians and organizational members who can “use the group’s
communications resources to mobilize members to vote by enhancing their sense of citizen duty by an
appeal to group loyalty”).
194 See Costas Panagopoulos, All About That Base: Changing Campaign Strategies in U.S.
Presidential Elections, 22 PARTY POL. 179 (2016) (describing different presidential campaigns strategies
over time).
195 PAUL S. HERRNSON, CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS: CAMPAIGNING AT HOME AND IN
WASHINGTON 202–26 (7th ed. 2016) (describing the strategic context of congressional campaigns).
191
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Campaigns spend a major share of their budget on advertisements and
voter mobilization. Television advertisements have been a central
component of campaigns since the 1950s.196 Such advertisements cost less to
reach a broader audience than door-to-door canvassing, which was the
dominant way campaigns reached out to potential voters before the advent
of television.197 Advertisements provided potential voters with information
about the candidate’s background, past support for policies, and future policy
proposals.198 Over time, campaigns increasingly have used attack or negative
advertisements to disparage opponents, highlight opponents’ past support for
policies disfavored by important segments of the electorate, and criticize
opponents’ future policy proposals.199
Campaigns have long viewed advertisements as an effective means of
mobilizing supporters, converting the undecided, and discouraging
opponents. But doubts emerged in the 1990s about the cost-effectiveness of
ads.200 Although campaigns feared the possible electoral effects of a
unilateral shift entirely away from advertisements, they began to experiment
with directing more money to mobilization activities.201
From the 1950s to the 1990s, mobilization activities remained constant
as campaigns focused attention on advertisements. About 20% to 25% of the
population reported that somebody from one of the political parties called or
visited them during presidential elections from 1956 to 1992.202 Then two
studies during the 1990s provided the impetus for greater campaign
investments in mobilization activities.203 These studies involved the random
selection of households to be contacted door-to-door, via phone calls, or
through mailers, and then a comparison between the turnout of those
196 See KATHLEEN HALL JAMIESON, PACKAGING THE PRESIDENCY: A HISTORY AND CRITICISM OF
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ADVERTISING 34 (3d ed. 1996).
197 Id.
198 Id.
199 John G. Geer, The News Media and the Rise of Negativity in Presidential Campaigns, 45 PS: POL.
SCI. & POL. 422, 422 & fig.1 (2012) (plotting the share of negative ads in presidential campaigns over
time and finding that less than 10% of ads were negative in 1960 while more than 60% of ads were
negative in 2008); see also DARRELL M. WEST, AIR WARS: TELEVISION ADVERTISING AND SOCIAL
MEDIA IN ELECTION CAMPAIGNS 1952–2012, at 66 fig.4-2 (6th ed. 2014) (showing increase of negative
ads as a percentage of total from 1952–2008).
200 RASMUS KLEIS NIELSEN, GROUND WARS: PERSONALIZED COMMUNICATION IN POLITICAL
CAMPAIGNS 18 (2012).
201 Id. at 41–44.
202
Time Series Cumulative Data File, Variable VCF9030 (1948–2016), AM.
NAT’L ELECTION STUD., https://electionstudies.org/data-center/anes-time-series-cumulative-data-file
[https://perma.cc/H3XB-PDGL] [hereinafter ANES].
203 See KLEIS NIELSEN, supra note 200, at 41–42 (describing the AFL-CIO’s experimentation and
testing of the effects of mobilization activities on turnout during the 1998 midterm election); Alan S.
Gerber & Donald P. Green, Does Canvassing Increase Voter Turnout? A Field Experiment, 96 PROC.
NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 10939 (1999).
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contacted in the households “treated” with different forms of contact and the
turnout of members of households not contacted in any of the three ways.
The studies found a statistically significant and substantial effect of door-todoor canvassing on turnout, but only a slight effect of mailers on turnout, and
virtually no effect of phone calls on turnout.204 Subsequent studies found that
more personalized phone calls that are interactive and responsive to
questions and feedback had a more substantial effect on turnout than the
more scripted calls used in the initial reported experiment.205
Such findings regarding the positive impact of mobilization activities
on turnout contrasted with subsequent research finding little to no turnout
effect from television advertisements.206 One explanation for this difference
is that mobilization activities are more personal. Whether in the form of a
door knock or a phone call, they involve a personal interaction that cannot
be replicated through a television advertisement. Campaigns gain two
possible advantages from these more personal interactions. First, campaigns
can tailor their message to the particular contacted person.207 Second, the

204 See KLEIS NIELSEN, supra note 200, at 41–44, Gerber & Green, The Effects of Canvassing, supra
note 21, at 661.
205 See Nickerson, Volunteer Phone Calls Can Increase Turnout, supra note 21, at 271. Robocalls
have been independently shown to be ineffective at mobilizing voters. See, e.g., Shang E. Ha & Dean S.
Karlan, Get-Out-the-Vote Phone Calls: Does Quality Matter?, 37 AM. POL. RES. 353, 363 (2009) (“This
finding suggests that although the number of interactions between callers and recipients matter, the
message needs to be focused for a GOTV phone call to be effective.”); Ricardo Ramírez, Giving Voice
to Latino Voters: A Field Experiment on the Effectiveness of a National Nonpartisan Mobilization Effort,
601 ANNALS AM. ACAD. SOC. & POL. SCI. 66, 77 (2005) (“In two of the sites, the estimated effect of robo
calls is positive, but the estimated effect is negative in the other three sites that employed robo calls. In
no sites are the effects positive and statistically significant. Once again, this is not surprising, as other
field experiments using automated calls have found them to be ineffective.”); Daron R. Shaw et al., Do
Robotic Calls from Credible Sources Influence Voter Turnout or Vote Choice? Evidence from a
Randomized Field Experiment, 11 J. POL. MARKETING 231, 231 (2012) (“Results suggest that the
automated calls had weak and statistically insignificant effects on turnout and vote margins.”). But see
Adam Zelizer, How Many Robocalls Are Too Many? Results from a Large-Scale Field Experiment, J.
POL. MARKETING: ONLINE 1, 6 (2018) (“These results suggest that get-out-the-vote calls can cut through
the noise in a busy electoral season, and that increased dosage [seven calls in eight days] may yield
increased turnout.”).
206 Joshua L. Kalla & David E. Broockman, The Minimal Persuasive Effects of Campaign Contact
in General Elections: Evidence from 49 Field Experiments, 112 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 148, 148 (2018)
(estimating the effect of TV ads on candidate choice at zero). But see Michael M. Franz & Travis N.
Ridout, Does Political Advertising Persuade?, 29 POL. BEHAVIOR 465, 486 (2007) (finding that the
“complete advertising environment” that incorporates multiple exposure to ads during the 2004 general
election had small effects on vote choice).
207 In the past, campaigns were constrained from tailoring messages because of the lack of
information they had about individuals prior to contacting them. But since the 2000 presidential election,
campaigns have expanded the universe of information they have about potential voters. Data vendors
collect and sell to campaigns individuals’ demographics, voting history, consumer preferences, and
associational activities, among other details. Campaigns then use this information to target specific
messages to potential voters that emphasize policy positions or candidate contrasts that are assumed most
relevant to the individual based on the data collected about the individual. This message tailoring reduces
the information costs of voting for contacted persons.
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more personal forms of contact can create a stronger sense of social pressure
to vote through an emphasis on voting as a civic duty or obligation to the
community.208
Campaign strategies shifted dramatically in response to these studies’
findings, which could be implemented using new data sources allowing voter
contact to be more personalized and effective. The percentage of potential
voters contacted by somebody from one of the political parties jumped more
than 7% between the 1992 and 1996 election (from just 18.8% to 26%) and
another 6% between the 1996 and 2000 election (from 26% to 32%). In the
2004 election, parties contacted 43% of surveyed respondents. Since then,
contact levels have remained consistently high from a historical
perspective.209 Between 2006 and 2016, more than 65% of respondents to the
Cooperative Congressional Election Study (n=249,627) reported that they
had been contacted by a candidate for political office.210
Although increased mobilization produces the democratic good of more
participation, there is a downside. Over the past forty years, there has been a
consistent and large disparity in campaigns’ contacts of different
socioeconomic classes.211 Campaigns generally contact the poor much less
than other socioeconomic classes.212 This disparity has continued as
campaigns have placed more emphasis on mobilization activities, thereby
exacerbating absolute differences between the number of poor people
contacted as compared to the number of people from other socioeconomic
classes. In the next Section, we identify the source of this contact disparity
and show how it leads to the phenomenon of passive voter suppression.
C. Strategic Mobilization and the Calculus of Contact
Political campaigns’ new commitment to mobilization has not changed
the fundamental reality that campaigns cannot mobilize everyone.
Campaigns face a budget constraint that requires them to make choices about
who to contact. Since the goal is to win elections, campaigns pursue cost-

208 See, e.g., LISA GARCÍA BEDOLLA & MELISSA R. MICHELSON, MOBILIZING INCLUSION:
TRANSFORMING THE ELECTORATE THROUGH GET-OUT-THE-VOTE CAMPAIGNS 54 (2012) (arguing that
the interpersonal sociocultural interaction associated with face-to-face canvassing leads the contacted
person to have a greater “cognitive identification . . . with the political process”).
209 ANES, supra note 202.
210 For a visual representation of these data in Figure 4, see infra notes 211–212 and accompanying
text.
211 Between 1978 and 1994, the ANES asked respondents whether they were contacted by a political
campaign. The gap in contact between the highest and lowest income quintiles ranged between 8% and
19%, with an average gap of 13.6%. Between 2006 and 2014, the CCES asked respondents whether they
were contacted by a political campaign. The gap between the highest and lowest income quintiles ranged
between 15% and 28% with an average gap of 22.4%. See infra Figure 3.
212 See infra Figure 4 (showing the income class-based disparity in contact since the late 1970s).
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effective mobilization strategies that will maximize the number of votes
gained per dollar spent.213 Such cost-effective mobilization requires
campaigns to make strategic calculations about the benefits of contacting
particular individuals and measure those benefits against the costs of
mobilizing voters.
We label this strategic calculation the calculus of contact. The calculus
does not lead to a single mobilization method; instead, it identifies factors
relevant to the mobilization decision that campaigns weigh and calculate
differently. Contacting is rational when the benefits from such contact
exceed the cost of such contact. Campaigns using the calculus of contact
usually start from the aggregate and assess, on the basis of the electoral
context, how many voters they will need to mobilize to win the election.
They then use this aggregate assessment to choose between mobilization
strategies that involve different probabilities related to securing a favorable
vote from the contact.
In the calculus of contact, there are two major costs associated with
mobilization. First, campaigns must pay and train staff to contact individuals.
Second, campaigns must pay for the data and technology necessary to
implement a mobilization strategy. Campaigns use these data to improve
their assessments of the probability that contacting an individual will yield
benefits for the candidate.
On the benefits side, campaigns seek favorable votes for their
candidates by contacting potential voters. To predict benefits from contact,
campaigns estimate the probability that an individual will vote in the election
and the probability that the person will vote for their candidate.214 Campaigns
also include in their predictions the probability that contacting a particular
individual will lead to the indirect mobilization of others in the potential
voter’s formal organization or social network. Campaigns target formal
organizational leaders or social network members who share the campaigns’
message, and place social pressure to vote on others in the organization or
network whom the campaign does not directly contact.215

See, e.g., GREEN & GERBER, supra note 21, at 2 (offering “a guide for campaigns and
organizations that seek to formulate cost-effective strategies for mobilizing voters”).
214 See, e.g., Costas Panagopoulos & Peter W. Wielhouwer, The Ground War 2000–2004: Strategic
Targeting in Grassroots Campaigns, 38 PRES. STUD. Q. 347, 350 (2008) (“Generally, findings confirm
the notion that parties contact people predisposed to participate in politics and are members of their
respective political coalitions.”).
215 See STEVEN J. ROSENSTONE & JOHN MARK HANSEN, MOBILIZATION, PARTICIPATION, AND
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 27 (1993) (“Political leaders [indirectly] mobilize citizens for political action
through social networks.”); Scott D. McClurg, Indirect Mobilization: The Social Consequences of Party
Contacts in an Election Campaign, 32 AM. POL. RES. 406, 418 (2004) (finding through an empirical
analysis that “people who are contacted are more likely to engage in interpersonal mobilization”).
213
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There is one consistent feature that cuts across virtually all
contemporary campaign mobilization strategies: the avoidance of
unregistered, infrequent, and nonvoters.216 As we argue in the next Section,
campaigns’ avoidance of these individuals introduces socioeconomic biases
into mobilization strategies that ultimately result in the passive suppression
of poor voters.
D. Passive Voter Suppression
Passive voter suppression is the suppression of votes that arises from
parties’ and candidates’ neglect of, and inattention to, particular potential
voters during an election campaign. In this Section, we show how passive
voter suppression is related to campaigns’ calculus of contact. We theorize
about how this calculus of contact has led parties and campaigns to
disproportionately ignore the poor in their political outreach. We then relate
the rich–poor contact gap to the persistent rich–poor turnout gap.
Campaigns applying the calculus of contact invariably try to avoid
contacting two groups of potential voters. The first group includes known
supporters of the opposing candidate. Contacting supporters of the opposing
candidate is highly unlikely to secure a favorable vote for the candidate. And
worse yet, contacting these individuals might contribute to their decision to
vote for the opponent. In a relatively competitive election, it is unlikely that
these potential voters will be completely ignored as the opposing candidate
has strong electoral incentives to contact them.
A second group includes those either not registered to vote or who
infrequently or never vote. This group that we label “persistent nonvoters”
raises two red flags within campaigns’ calculus of contact. First, given the
positive relationship between past and future turnout behavior, the
probability that contacting nonvoters will result in a vote is likely to be lower
than that for more frequent voters.217
Even if campaigns’ contact of persistent nonvoters resulted in votes,
uncertainty about how they might vote creates a second reason for campaigns
to avoid them. Without information about nonvoters’ partisan affiliation or
preferences, which for regular voters might be included in a registration form
216 See EITAN D. HERSH, HACKING THE ELECTORATE: HOW CAMPAIGNS PERCEIVE VOTERS 146–47
(2015) (describing how contemporary mobilization strategies typically involve campaigns ignoring
infrequent voters).
217
See, e.g., Alexander Coppock & Donald P. Green, Is Voting Habit Forming? New Evidence from
Experiments and Regression Discontinuities, 60 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1044, 1060 (2016) (finding that
“mobilizing 100 compliers today generates 50 more votes over the five federal elections in the decade to
come”); Alan S. Gerber et al., Voting May Be Habit-Forming: Evidence from a Randomized Field
Experiment, 47 AM. J. POL. SCI. 540, 545–46 (2003) (finding evidence through a field experiment that
voting may be habit forming in that those who vote in past elections are more likely to vote in future
elections).
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or voting history indicating participation in one of the parties’ primaries,
campaigns will not have any bases for predicting how past nonvoters might
vote in the future. Mobilizing persistent nonvoters might not only activate a
nonvoter who is a latent supporter of the opponent and lead her to vote for
the opponent. It might also activate a network of latent supporters of the
opponent and lead a group of people to vote for the opponent. That risk, when
combined with the relatively low likelihood that the nonvoter would vote if
contacted, leads campaigns to mostly ignore nonvoters in their mobilization
activities.
Campaigns have employed various mobilization strategies designed, in
part, to avoid nonvoters. Prior to the 2000s, campaigns mostly relied on
geographic precinct voting data to inform their mobilization strategies.218
Campaigns used this data to focus their mobilization efforts on precincts with
higher aggregate turnout and with favorable voting patterns for the
candidate’s party.219 With the advent of better sources of data post-2000, the
more well-funded campaigns used “microtargeting” tactics in which they
were able to target specific households within precincts (and individuals
within households) for mobilization.220 Microtargeting allowed for a more
precise exclusion of nonvoters from the pool of people contacted.
FIGURE 3: DEMOCRATIC PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE CONTACT RATES IN OHIOc

c

Contact rates by the John Kerry presidential campaign (2004) and the Barack Obama presidential
campaigns (2008 and 2012) in Ohio, by the partisanship and likelihood of voting of each target, as
estimated by Catalist LLC. Source: Figure originally published in David W. Nickerson & Todd Rogers,
Political Campaigns and Big Data, 28 J. ECON. PERSP. 51, 63 (2014). Copyright American Economic
Association; reproduced with permission of the Journal of Economic Perspectives.

David Nickerson and Todd Rogers recently published a heatmap
(reprinted in Figure 3 above) of Democratic presidential campaign

218 See KLEIS NIELSEN, supra note 200, at 144–45 (describing prior mobilization strategies that relied
on precinct-based targeting of potential voters).
219 HUCKFELDT & SPRAGUE, supra note 182, at 236–37 (describing evidence of such geographic
based canvassing based on neighborhood or precinct voting data).
220 See HERSH, supra note 216.
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mobilization patterns in Ohio between 2004 and 2012 that shows how
microtargeting has led to increasing disparities in contact between higher and
lower propensity voters.221 In 2004, the presidential campaign of John Kerry
relied mostly on a neighborhood precinct strategy that resulted in some
disparities in contact between low and high propensity voters.222 In 2008, the
campaign of Barack Obama shifted to a more microtargeted approach to
mobilization,223 although the new approach did not lead to a dramatically
different contact pattern as the Obama campaign devoted much more
resources to mobilization activities overall, allowing it to extend its reach to
more low propensity voters.224 But by 2012, President Obama’s campaign
leaned heavily on a microtargeting mobilization strategy, and the result was
a much larger disparity in contact between low and high propensity voters.225
These low turnout voters that campaigns ignore are disproportionately
individuals from lower socioeconomic classes. Data and analytics from
vendors like Catalist both drive and reinforce campaigns’ tendency to ignore
the poor. For campaigns using data vendors and their extensive collection of
personal information, the goal is to improve the number of votes per dollar
spent from mobilization activities.226 The figure below reveals how this costeffectiveness comes at a cost in terms of socioeconomic disparities in
contact, showing the positive relationship between Catalist turnout
predictions and potential voters’ income. Between 2008 and 2014, the
predicted likelihood that an individual would turn out to vote increased with
her income.227

221 See David W. Nickerson & Todd Rogers, Political Campaigns and Big Data, 28 J. ECON. PERSP.
51, 63 & fig.1 (2014).
222 Id. at 63 (describing the lack of reliance on predictive scores for targeting in the 2004 presidential
campaign).
223 Id. at 63–64 (explaining the shift to greater reliance on predictive scores for targeting in the 2008
presidential campaign).
224 Id. (finding that “[t]he highest concentrations of direct contacts were observed among citizens
who were predicted to support Democratic candidates but who had low likelihoods of voting”).
225 Id. at 64 (suggesting that presidential campaigns in 2012 “avoided communicating with citizens
with the lowest turnout probabilities”).
226 See HERSH, supra note 216, at 15–21 (describing the data vendors and the information that these
data vendors sell to campaigns).
227 Our data are from a one percent sample of Catalist’s national voter file (n=1,556,196).

682

114:633 (2019)

Passive Voter Supression

FIGURE 4: ESTIMATED TURNOUT PROBABILITIES BY INCOME QUINTILEd
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Distribution of the estimated probability that a registered voter will vote by five equally sized income
quintiles. Source: Random sample of registered voters (n=1.5 million) in the national file maintained by
Catalist LLC.

Such predictions ultimately contribute to socioeconomic class biases in
campaign contact. Data from the American National Election Studies
(ANES) and the Cooperative Congressional Election Study help reveal the
disparities in campaign contact of potential voters in the top and bottom
income quintiles. The ANES data show a persistently large 7% to 17% rich–
poor contact gap between 1978 and 1994.228 According to the more recent
CCES data, this gap has grown. Between 2006 and 2016, the rich–poor
contact gap has ranged from 16% to 28%.229

228 ANES, supra note 202. Our measure of the proportion of individuals contacted each year reflects
any respondent to the ANES who answered “yes” to one of several questions about campaign contact.
These questions are reflected in variables VCF0946a (contacted by incumbent), VCF0947a (contacted by
challenger), VCF0948a (contacted by Democrat), VCF0949a (contacted by Republican) of the
cumulative data file. The sample size is 18,069 spanning the election years 1978 to 1994.
229 The CCES is a two-wave internet survey of a stratified national sample of 30,000 to 60,000
individuals. The CCES has been administered during each election year since 2006 by the firm YouGov.
A one-panel survey is also administered during non-election years. CCES respondents were asked
whether a candidate or political campaign had contacted them during an election year on the 2006
(v4065), 2007 (CC06_V4065), 2010 (CC425a), 2012 (CC425a), 2014 (CC425a), and 2016 (CC16_425a)
surveys.
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FIGURE 5: SELF-REPORTED CONTACT STRATIFIED BY INCOMEe

e

Self-reported contact by candidates and/or political campaigns, stratified by income. Actual earnings
are not coded uniformly across surveys. Income quintiles represent five equally sized groups of survey
respondents in each year. Source: ANES Time Series Cumulative Data File (1978–1994) and the CCES
Common Content (2006–2016).

Particularly troubling is the fact that the rich–poor contact gap in 2010
and 2014 represented the largest gap in any presidential or midterm election
since the ANES started surveying people in 1978. This growing contact gap
corresponds with campaigns’ increasing use of data and microtargeting
mobilization strategies over the past decade.230
Campaigns’ decisions to disproportionately ignore the poor in their
mobilization activities appear to drive at least a part of the persistent rich–
poor turnout gap. According to experimental studies testing the causal effect
of door-to-door canvassing on turnout, a campaign’s decision to contact an
individual through door-to-door mobilization is predicted to increase their
likelihood of voting by as much as 7% to 10%.231 Studies also estimate that
campaigns’ more tailored phone call contact with potential voters increases

The total sample size for these years is 249,627. Shiro Kuriwaki, Cumulative CCES Common Content
(2006–2018), HARV. DATAVERSE, https://cces.gov.harvard.edu [https://perma.cc/5FU2-KZSG]. For
information about the survey’s design and methodology, see Lynn Vavreck & Douglas Rivers, The 2006
Cooperative Congressional Election Study, 18 J. ELECTIONS PUB. OPINION & PARTIES 355 (2008).
230 See HERSH, supra note 216, at 147–50 (describing the increase use of microtargeting strategies
by well-funded campaigns).
231 Gerber & Green, The Effects of Canvassing, supra note 21, at 658 n.8; Green et al., Getting Out
the Vote in Local Elections, supra note 21, at 1094.
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turnout by 3% to 5%.232 Thus, when we multiply the socioeconomic class
contact gap by the causal effect of canvassing and phone calls on turnout, we
see that campaigns’ disproportionate orientation of mobilization activities
away from the poor could account for approximately 10% of the
approximately 30% turnout gap between the rich and poor.233 That effect
accounts for far more of the turnout gap than the new voter suppression laws
do.234
The explanatory value of the socioeconomic bias in campaign contacts
is greater when we incorporate the indirect mobilization effects from
campaign contacts. Social scientists have found that voter contacts have a
contagion effect on turnout among others in the network of the individual
contacted.235 Another study by David Nickerson assesses the contagion effect
of mobilization on turnout in two cities found that those who received a doorto-door canvassing appeal to vote were 8.6% to 10.9% more likely to vote
than the control groups.236 Beyond this direct mobilization effect, the study
found that “[t]he treated person passed on 64% and 59% of the increased
propensity to vote” onto the other person in the household in the two studied
cities, respectively.
This means that “a person who might be 25% likely to vote in the
primary would become 85% likely to vote as a direct result of a cohabitant
deciding to vote.” That is a huge effect, with the increase in likelihood of
voting from contagion exceeding the socioeconomic turnout gap that existed
at the time of the study in 2008 between persons with advanced degrees and
persons with eighth grade educations, and between persons in households
with less than $10,000 in income and persons in households earning more
than $60,000. The study demonstrates that within households, at least,
232 Melissa R. Michelson et al., Heeding the Call: The Effect of Targeted Two-Round Phone Banks
on Voter Turnout, 71 J. POL. 1549, 1559 (2009) (finding that multiple phone calls to targeted likely voters
increases turnout up to 10.3%); David W. Nickerson, Quality Is Job One: Professional and Volunteer
Voter Mobilization Calls, 51 AM. J. POL. SCI. 269, 275 (2007) (finding that higher quality, more
conversational phone calls to potential voters by professionals increased turnout by 3% at the national
level and 5% at the local level); David W. Nickerson, Volunteer Phone Calls Can Increase Turnout:
Evidence from Eight Field Experiments, 34 AM. POL. RES. 271, 283 (2006) (finding that volunteer phone
banks increased turnout by 3.8%).
233 In 2016, there was a 20% rich–poor contact gap. The cumulative effect of the two forms of
mobilization on turnout (face-to-face and phone contact) is 15%. If we assume that the mobilization effect
is cumulative and consistent across voters, the elimination of the rich–poor contact gap through a 20%
increase in campaigns’ contact of the poor should increase poor turnout by 3% (0.15 × 0.20) and reduce
the turnout gap from 30% to 27%.
234 See supra Figure 1 (showing the relatively minor effect of voter ID laws on the rich–poor turnout
gap); supra notes 114–115 and accompanying text (describing the relatively minor effect of voter ID laws
as compared to income on the rich–poor turnout gap).
235 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
236 Nickerson, supra note 16, at 54. The following discussion of this study is sourced from pages 53–
55 and Table 2.
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“voting is a highly contagious behavior.” The contagion effect is likely to
diminish somewhat moving from cohabitants to friends, neighbors,
coworkers, and associates. But experimental research indicates that the
contagion effect of mobilization persists within social networks.237
Although it is difficult to quantify precisely, when we include the
indirect mobilization effect on turnout, a conservative estimate of the effect
of eliminating passive voter suppression is a further 2% to 3% reduction in
the turnout gap. Thus, combining the direct and indirect mobilization effect
of campaign contacts might reduce the rich–poor turnout gap by about
15%.238
In subsequent elections, there would be a persistent additive or even
multiplier effect of the elimination of the socioeconomic contact gap on the
rich–poor turnout gap. Studies show that voting is habit-forming over time
and consistent engagement with nonvoters across elections can turn them
into occasional or even frequent voters.239 A cycle could therefore emerge in
which the continuous reach of campaigns into new communities of nonvoters
continues to chip away at the turnout gap.
Furthermore, every person that transitions from a nonvoter to a voter is
a part of a social network. These new voters receive tailored information
about the election and increase the number of politically active individuals
in a network. Such new voters can enhance political communication within
the network and embed in other members a sense of duty to vote, thereby
improving turnout in previously politically marginalized communities.
A virtuous cycle of political inclusion and concomitant reductions in
the rich–poor turnout gap will not result from eliminating voter ID laws,
prohibitions on voter purges, or making voting more convenient through
early voting or Election Day holidays. Even automatic voter registration
(which we discuss below) is no panacea. Voter registration is a serious
barrier for many individuals, and the burden of registering to vote falls
disproportionately on the poor. However, even among those who are
registered to vote, turnout varies significantly by income. As illustrated in
Figure 6, the gap in registration rates between the wealthiest quintile (earning
approximately $70,000 or more per year) and the poorest quintile (earning
approximately less than $20,000 per year) is 27%. Even among these
individuals, who have exhibited the requisite interest in politics and effort to

237 See Robert M. Bond et al., A 61-Million-Person Experiment in Social Influence and Political
Mobilization, 487 NATURE 295, 297–98 (2012) (showing the indirect mobilization effect of online social
pressure to vote between close friends through a randomized controlled trial of all Facebook users on the
day of the 2010 congressional elections).
238 See supra note 233.
239 See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
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register to vote, we observe an income gap in voter turnout. The turnout gap
between the wealthiest and poorest quintiles is 19%, which is much smaller
than the gap in turnout as a percentage of the total voting age population but
is still larger than the gap between White and Black voters (approximately
15%). Thus, even automatic voter registration will likely not eliminate the
rich–poor turnout gap. But we might be able to shrink this gap through efforts
to combat campaigns’ passive voter suppression. In the next Part, we turn to
the question of how to address passive voter suppression. We argue that
doing so will require a fundamental shift in how election lawyers use law as
a tool to address participatory inequality.
FIGURE 6: VOTING AND REGISTRATION RATES BY INCOMEf

f

Rate of voter registration and voter turnout by equally sized income quintiles. Even among those who
are registered to vote we observe a gap of nearly 20% in turnout between the highest and lowest quintiles.
Source: Current Population Survey Voting and Registration Supplement, 2004–2016.

IV.

COMBATING PASSIVE VOTER SUPPRESSION

There is no silver bullet to the problem of passive voter suppression.
The conventional response to active forms of voter suppression used
throughout American history, which involved the passage of prohibitory
laws directed at state actors or judicial invalidations of suppressive laws as
unconstitutional, is not suitable to combat passive voter suppression.240
Political parties in their mobilization activities are not likely to be considered
state actors for purposes of applying constitutional rights prohibitions.241 And
240 See, e.g., Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 4, 79 Stat. 437, 438–39 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 10501 (2012)) (suspending and then ultimately banning literacy tests); Harper v.
Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 686 (1966) (declaring state poll taxes unconstitutional).
241 See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 620 (1991) (“[T]he conduct of private
parties lies beyond the Constitution’s scope in most instances [except when] governmental authority may
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even if parties were considered state actors, constitutional freedom of speech
and association prevent the state from forcing political parties to contact
certain people or institutions as part of their mobilization campaigns.242
Given this reality, we argue that combating passive voter suppression
requires a multipronged strategy that deviates from the conventional legal
responses to active voter suppression. Central to campaigns’ calculus of
contact are two probability determinations and a budget constraint. First,
campaigns assess the change in the probability that an individual will vote
on the basis of the contact.243 Second, campaigns assess the change in the
probability that an individual will vote favorably for the candidate as a result
of the contact.244 Finally, campaigns must consider how many people they
can contact given their budget constraint, which is set by the amount of
contributions that campaigns receive from donors.245
In this Part, we focus on how law could be used to manipulate the
probability assessments in the calculus of contact. Similar to the calculus of
voting, we argue that information is a key factor that can influence
campaigns’ calculus of contact in a way that could lessen their bias against
mobilizing the poor.
Campaigns rely on two critical pieces of information in assessing the
impact of contact on individuals’ likelihood of voting. First, campaigns rely
on registration information.246 Individuals who are not registered are
typically harder to mobilize to vote because they still have to overcome
registration barriers in order to vote. Second, campaigns rely on information

dominate an activity to such an extent that its participants must be deemed to act with the authority of the
government . . . .”); see also Nathaniel Persily & Bruce E. Cain, The Legal Status of Political Parties: A
Reassessment of Competing Paradigms, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 775, 777 (2000) (describing “[t]he crux of
the problem political parties pose for lawyers and judges” as being whether parties are “state actors and
therefore subject to constitutional restraints imposed by the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment
or . . . private associations . . . that can use the Constitution as a shield against state power”).
242 See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000) (“The forced inclusion of an unwanted
person in a group infringes the group’s freedom of expressive association if the presence of that person
affects in a significant way the group’s ability to advocate public or private viewpoints.”); West Virginia
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (declaring compelled speech to be a violation of
the First Amendment freedom of speech).
243 See Panagopoulos & Wielhouwer, supra note 214, at 350.
244 See id.
245 The size of a campaign’s budget is driven by some factors that are less subject to legal
manipulation, such as the candidate’s wealth, public reputation, and embeddedness within networks of
people with larger capacities to contribute to campaigns. But it is also driven by a factor that, in some
cases, can be manipulated legally—the competitiveness of electoral jurisdiction. Holding all other factors
constant, more competitive races draw more donations to campaigns from individuals and parties. ROLFE,
supra note 161, at 99–100 (reviewing the literature finding that “in higher-stakes races, candidates and
other actors will have more resources to spend on mobilizing the electorate, leading to higher rates of
voter turnout”).
246 See HERSH, supra note 216, at 29 (“Most strategic campaigns do not focus on transmitting
appeals . . . to citizens not registered to vote.”).
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about individuals’ voting history, specifically the elections in which the
individual has voted in the recent past (information about how individuals
voted is not publicly available in any state).247 Campaigns generally consider
people with more scant voting histories to be harder (and therefore less costeffective) to mobilize than people with more robust voting histories.248
Campaigns’ assessments about the change in the probability that an
individual will vote favorably for the candidate as a result of contact is
derived primarily from information about individuals’ partisan affiliations,
but also from other evidence collected by data vendors.249 The choice of
campaign strategy—base mobilization or voter persuasion—will dictate
which individuals along the partisan spectrum campaigns will contact.250 But
consistent with both strategies is campaigns’ reluctance to contact
individuals for whom they have little to no information about partisan
preferences.251
Law cannot change how campaigns make these probability
assessments, but it can change what information is available to campaigns to
make these probability assessments. Below, we first describe the current
information environment that states and data vendors have constructed for
political campaigns, which we argue has contributed to the problem of
passive voter suppression. To do this, we describe the results of our fiftystate survey of state election laws to identify what information is available
to campaigns to make the probability assessments that are central to the
calculus of contact.252
We then advance three alternative information environments that could
change how campaigns apply the calculus of contact and identify the
strengths and weaknesses of each alternative. The three alternative
information environments we identify are: (1) a no-information
environment; (2) a full-information environment; and (3) a partialinformation environment. As a preliminary matter, we conclude that a partial
See id. at 147 (identifying vote history as critical data that campaigns use “to isolate segments of
the electorate to whom they will direct their attention”); see also Access to and Use of Voter Registration
Lists,
NAT’L
CONF.
ST.
LEGISLATURES
(Aug.
5,
2019)
http://www.ncsl.org/
research/elections-and-campaigns/access-to-and-use-of-voter-registration-lists.aspx
[https://perma.cc/JRZ9-QVNP] (summarizing each state’s laws on access to voter lists).
248 See HERSH, supra note 216, at 146 (“In a general election campaign, [campaigns often] ignor[e]
citizens who are not registered or have voted very infrequently in the past.”).
249 See, e.g., Catalist One Percent Codebook (on file with authors) (showing the different sources of
the Catalist data, the partisanship model, and partisanship scores for all persons in its database).
250 See HERSH, supra note 216, at 142 (describing the campaign contacting patterns for the two
mobilization strategies).
251 See KLEIS NIELSEN, supra note 200, at 155–59 (identifying data on people’s partisan leanings as
one of the most important pieces of information that campaign targeting consultants use in constructing
a mobilization strategy).
252 See infra Table 1.
247
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information environment might be best to combat passive voter suppression,
but we encourage future empirical work on the effect of different information
environments on campaigns’ mobilization efforts.
A. The Current Information Environment for Campaigns
The administration of elections is primarily a state affair.253 States set
voting qualifications, subject to limitations established in the Constitution,
run elections, and collect and distribute voter information related to
elections. States have historically delegated responsibilities for keeping and
distributing voter information to localities.254 In the past, voter registration
lists were the most important piece of information that local election officials
kept. In 1993, however, the federal National Voter Registration Act (NVRA)
provided states with financial incentives to better maintain their bloated voter
registration rolls, which included individuals who had left the state, died, or
otherwise became ineligible to vote.255 Then in 2002, Congress adopted the
Help America Vote Act (HAVA) as a response to the failures in election
administration during the 2000 presidential election.256 HAVA provided
states with financial incentives to create a computerized statewide voter
registration list.257
In just over a decade, voter registration list maintenance was transferred
from over 13,000 counties, cities, and towns to fifty states and the District of
Columbia.258 The newly centralized voter registration lists were a boon for
campaigns seeking to engage in mobilization activities.259 Rather than
needing to cobble together registration lists from multiple localities
throughout a district or state, campaigns could engage in one-stop shopping
at the state level. In the 2008 presidential election campaign, President
Obama took advantage of the centralized voter registration lists to put

253

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
See HERSH, supra note 216, at 62–63 (describing how towns and counties controlled registration
prior to the National Voter Registration Act and the Help America Vote Act).
255 National Voter Registration Act, 52 U.S.C. § 20507 (2012); see also HERSH, supra note 216, at
63 (describing the background and intent underlying the NVRA).
256 Rabia Belt, Contemporary Voting Rights Controversies Through the Lens of Disability, 68 STAN.
L. REV. 1491, 1503 (2016).
257 Help America Vote Act, 52 U.S.C. §§ 21083, 21041 (2012); see also SASHA ISSENBERG, THE
VICTORY LAB: THE SECRET SCIENCE OF WINNING CAMPAIGNS 245 (2012) (describing how HAVA
“encouraged states to centralize their electoral data and organize their voter files in standard formats that
for the first time made it easy to manipulate records across state lines”).
258 See NAT’L COMM’N ON FED. ELECTION REFORM, TO ASSURE PRIDE AND CONFIDENCE IN THE
ELECTORAL PROCESS 29 (Jimmy Carter et al. eds., 2002) (describing the pre-HAVA registration system
where registration data was “usually recorded and maintained in the separate files of the nearly 13,000
local election jurisdictions of the United States”).
259 ISSENBERG, supra note 257, at 245.
254
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together the most comprehensive and sophisticated mobilization operation
in history.260
Registration lists contain information about voters that is critical to
campaigns. First, the lists themselves only include the names and addresses
of individuals who are registered to vote in the state.261 Campaigns can
therefore easily avoid unregistered persons. Second, at least 35 states make
information about individuals’ voting histories available to parties and
candidates (see Table 1 below). Some states provide specific information
about the elections in which individuals have voted in the past. Other states
distribute lists of inactive voters to candidates and parties (lists of individuals
who have either moved, not voted in elections over the past two years, or
both) that the NVRA requires states to keep and maintain.
In 34 states, registration lists available to candidates and campaigns
include information about individuals’ partisan affiliation or party
preferences. In the 36 states with primaries limited to persons with a
particular partisan affiliation or nonaffiliation, the collection about
individuals’ partisan affiliations, and its distribution to parties, is necessary
for the operation of the primary system.262
Given the high percentage of voters that identify as independents in the
United States (39% as of January 2019),263 the more well-funded campaigns
purchase information about individuals’ partisan tendencies from private
data vendors to assess the probability that individuals will vote favorably for
the candidate as a result of contact. For example, Catalist, a private data
vendor that the Obama campaign purchased information from, assigns
partisan scores to individuals on the basis of information about individuals’
characteristics and behaviors collected from sources such as the United
States Census, the Federal Reserve, public records, media outlets, and
infoUSA.264 Most campaigns cannot afford the cost of information from data

260 See, e.g., Sasha Issenberg, How Obama’s Team Used Big Data to Rally Voters, MIT TECH. REV.
(Dec. 19, 2012), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/509026/how-obamas-team-used-big-data-torally-voters [https://perma.cc/5TJE-L7MS] (describing how the Obama campaign used publicly available
data and data vendors to fuel its mobilization operation).
261 The Alaska state law on the preparation of registration lists is a typical state registration law in
that it includes “the names and addresses of all persons whose names appear on the master register.”
ALASKA STAT. § 15.07.127 (2018).
262 See State Primary Election Types, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (June 26, 2018),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/primary-types
[https://perma.cc/AR53-SDZF]
(describing the state primary election types in the various states).
263 Party Affiliation, GALLUP, https://news.gallup.com/poll/15370/paMinnesotarty-affiliation.aspx
[https://perma.cc/HJ4B-4GAJ] (reporting trends monthly since 2004 in answering, “[i]n politics, as of
today, do you consider yourself a Republican, a Democrat or an Independent?”).
264 See Catalist One Percent Codebook, supra note 249.
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vendors and therefore rely on the cheaper and sometimes free state sources
of information.265
In Table 1, we present a taxonomy of state voter information
distribution regimes focusing on the two pieces of information critical to the
calculus of contact—voting history and partisan affiliation. More than half
of the states distribute both individuals’ voter history information in some
form and individuals’ partisan affiliation, providing campaigns with access
to the information critical to making the necessary probability assessments
in the calculus of contact. This information environment has likely helped
produce the large rich–poor disparities in contact over the past three
presidential elections that we associate with passive voter suppression. What
are possible alternative information environments and how might they
impact passive voter suppression? In the next Section, we identify those
alternatives and offer tentative predictions about likely changes to passive
voter suppressions in each of the information environments.

See Nickerson & Rogers, supra note 221, at 66 (“[S]maller campaigns will benefit most from
targeting based on predictive scores, but they are also the campaigns that are least able to afford hiring
campaign data analysts and voter databases.”).
265
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TABLE 1: FIFTY STATE SURVEY OF VOTER INFORMATION DISCLOSUREg

Discloses Partisan Affiliation

Discloses Voter History
No

Yes

No

Arkansas
Georgia
Hawaii
Indiana
Montana
South Carolina
Texas
Vermont

Alabama
Michigan
Mississippi
Missouri
North Dakota
Tennessee
Virginia
Wisconsin

Yes

Alaska
Idaho
Illinois
Kentucky
Louisiana
New Mexico
Oregon
Wyoming

Arizona
California
Colorado
Delaware
D.C.
Florida
Maine
Maryland
Minnesota

Discloses list of inactive voters with partisan affiliation:

Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
North Carolina
Ohio
Pennsylvania
South Dakota
Utah

Connecticut
Iowa
Kansas
Massachusetts
New York
Oklahoma
Rhode Island
West Virginia

g

Taxonomy of states by disclosure of voter history and voter partisanship to political campaigns and the
public. Source: Authors’ coding of state statutes, as of 2019.

B. Alternative Information Environments to Combat Voter Suppression
1. The No-Information Environment
One alternative information environment is one in which states deny to
parties and campaigns the voter information critical to the calculus of
voting—registration status, voter history, and partisan affiliation. States in
this no-information environment would not only deny this information to
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parties and campaigns but also to the public and the data vendors who could
distribute or sell the information to campaigns.
No states currently deny campaigns all three pieces of information. The
eight states that deny information about individuals’ voting history and
partisan affiliation to parties still provide them with registration lists that
identify the registration status of persons within the state. The one state,
North Dakota, that does not keep registration lists because it does not require
registration in order to vote, still provides parties and campaigns with voter
lists, which identify individuals who have voted in past elections and
includes four years of their voting history.266 To the extent that a substantial
portion of the electorate is concerned about electoral integrity and
registration systems are seen as important vehicles for preserving such
integrity, registration requirements are not going anywhere.267 But just
because a state maintains a registration system does not mean that it has to
make registration lists and accompanying information about individuals’
voting history and partisan affiliation accessible to parties.
Denying this information to campaigns could reduce passive voter
suppression through the complete disruption of the calculus of contact.
Without this voter information, it would be much harder for campaigns to
make either of the probability assessments that guide their decisions about
whom to contact. And through this disruption, campaigns’ contact patterns
might become less biased against the poor.
There are, however, two problems with this response to passive voter
suppression. First, campaigns would not be completely in the dark about
individuals’ voter behavior and partisan preferences. Aggregate voting
information would continue to be collected at the precinct level and broadly
available to the public as a part of the public vote counting exercise that is a
part of every election. From the precinct data, campaigns can identify
differences in turnout levels and partisan voting patterns and make decisions
about which neighborhoods to canvass.268 Campaigns would likely use this
precinct-level data from prior elections to inform their much cruder
probability assessments.

266 See N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-02-12 (2019) (identifying the information contained and maintained
in the central voter file); id. § 16.1-02-15 (making available voter lists and reports for election-related
purposes).
267 See, e.g., Dayna L. Cunningham, Who Are to Be Electors? A Reflection on the History of Voter
Registration in the United States, 9 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 370, 373 (1991) (identifying fraud prevention
as the principal justification for registration systems in the modern context).
268 See,
e.g.,
Harvard
Election
Data
Archive,
HARV.
DATAVERSE,
https://projects.iq.harvard.edu/eda/data [https://perma.cc/EZ7J-MMFP] (collecting precinct-level voting
data and linking it to geographic boundary files).
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The loss of information would thus reduce campaigns’ capacity to
microtarget individuals for contact, but rational campaigns will still target
particular neighborhoods with greater numbers of voters and, depending on
the mobilization strategy, with particular partisan compositions.269 The
neighborhood-level mobilization targeting caused by the loss of information
would be less efficient for campaigns and would likely lead to some
improvement in socioeconomic equity in campaign contact. But given the
degree of socioeconomic segregation in the United States and the correlation
between income, educational attainment, and voting, campaigns would
likely avoid entire low-income neighborhoods.270 Alternatively, campaigns
may look for proxies that predict income relatively well and are easy (i.e.,
less costly) to observe. One such proxy may be race. Similar to “ban the box”
policies that prohibit employers from asking about applicants’ criminal
histories on job applications (but have resulted in fewer callbacks for black
job applicants), the attempt to help a disadvantaged group may backfire by
driving campaigns to less reliable signals and stereotypes.271
Second, a no-information environment may not be possible. Data
vendors would still collect other publicly available information and use it to
make predictions about partisan preferences. More importantly, the closed
and semi-closed primary systems that exist in many states require the
distribution of information about registered voters’ partisan affiliation so that
the parties can properly run their primaries. Parties in these states will
therefore acquire access to information about individuals’ partisan
preferences and their voter registration statuses. These two bits of
information would create opportunities for campaigns to more precisely
target individuals for contact using the calculus of contact.
2. The Full-Information Environment
On the other extreme is a full-information environment. A fullinformation environment would be one in which states collected information
about all eligible voters’ registration status, voter history, and partisan
affiliation and make this information accessible to parties and campaigns. As
seen in Table 1, seventeen states and the District of Columbia currently
collect and share information about registered persons’ voting history and
269 See HERSH, supra note 216, at 57 (“A chief alternative to individual-level targeting based on
registration records was, and still is, geographic-level targeting based on past election returns.”).
270
See, e.g., Sean F. Reardon & Kendra Bischoff, Income Inequality and Income Segregation,
116 AM. J. SOC. 1092, 1115–25 (2011) (describing the trends in residential income segregation since
1970); see also supra note 146 and accompanying text.
271 See, e.g., Amanda Agan & Sonja Starr, Ban the Box, Criminal Records, and Racial
Discrimination: A Field Experiment, 133 Q. J. ECON. 191 (2017) (finding that the Black–White gap in
callbacks for hypothetical candidates for job interviews increased when employers were unable to ask
about the criminal history).
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partisan affiliation. Another eight states maintain and share active and
inactive voter lists that provide some information about registered persons’
voting history and their partisan affiliation.
Although these states provide more information about individuals than
any other, they still come up short in providing full information about
persons eligible to vote within their jurisdictions. States generally do not
collect or share any information about unregistered persons. In fact, every
state except Massachusetts collects and shares only information about
registered voters.272 Parties and campaigns that rely on information from the
state therefore do not know who unregistered persons are, where they live,
what their voting history is (for those who may have been registered and
voted in another state), or what their partisan affiliation is.
A completely full-information environment is probably unrealistic
given that not even the relatively well-funded United States Census is able
to collect information about everyone in the country.273 But there are two
potential pathways to a fuller information environment. The first is to follow
the example of Massachusetts. In addition to collecting information about
registered voters, towns in Massachusetts prepare and maintain “street lists,”
making it the only state that provides parties and campaigns with information
about unregistered persons.274 These street lists include the identity, address,
date of birth, occupation, and nationality of all persons in the state who are
seventeen years of age and older and an asterisk next to the name of persons
who are registered to vote.275 But these street lists do not include information
about voting history, and partisan affiliation is not consistently included.276
States could replicate Massachusetts’s “street list” approach and add survey
questions about individuals’ voting histories and partisan affiliations, then
share all of the resulting data with parties.
A fuller information environment might reduce the rich–poor contact
gap because campaigns with information about the partisan preferences of
unregistered persons might be more inclined to contact them. But campaigns

272

See infra note 274 and accompanying text.
See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY: RESPONSE RATES,
https://www.census.gov/acs/www/methodology/sample-size-and-data-quality/response-rates
[https://perma.cc/SYT7-R73C] (identifying a response rate ranging from 90% to 98% depending on the
year from 2000 to 2017).
274 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 51, § 4.
275
Id.
276 Towns in Massachusetts annually compile street lists by mailing forms that include all the
information about voter eligible persons in the household to all addresses in the town. Adults in the
household are required to return the forms to the town clerk, and if they fail to do so, they are designated
as inactive voters on the street list. See, e.g., Question and Answers About the Annual Street List Form,
TOWN OF WALES, https://www.townofwales.net/sites/walesma/files/uploads/faqs_about_the_annual_
street_list_form.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q9P5-CXM7].
273

696

114:633 (2019)

Passive Voter Supression

might still be reluctant to contact these individuals because they are
unregistered and presumably lack much of a voting history. It is difficult to
know how much the addition of partisan preference information on
unregistered persons would change the campaigns’ contact calculus, but it is
likely that a different approach which provides fuller information about
potential voters would have some effect on reducing the contact gap.
In this second pathway, states obtain fuller information about eligible
voters through an automatic voter registration (AVR) system. In 2015,
Oregon became the first state to adopt AVR.277 Eleven more states adopted
AVR between 2016 and 2018 and at least twenty-four other states are
expected to adopt AVR in 2019.278 The AVR systems are enhancements on
the federal National Voter Registration Act’s (NVRA) method for
registering voters. The NVRA conditioned federal funding to states on the
adoption of a voter registration system that would allow individuals to
register to vote when they apply for a driver’s license at a state motor vehicle
agency or for public assistance at a state public assistance agency.279
The NVRA made voter registration more broadly accessible, but
because it operated according to an opt-in model, in which persons would
need to come into contact with one of the state agencies and would need to
decide to register to vote, many remained unregistered. The opt-in NVRA
model has produced only minor gains in the percentage of persons who
report being registered to vote. According to the United States Census
Bureau Voting and Registration Supplement, 68.2% of U.S. citizens aged 18
years and older reported being registered to vote in 1992, the last presidential
election year before the adoption of the NVRA.280 In the most recent
presidential election in 2016, 70.3% of citizens aged 18 years and older
reported being registered to vote.281
In contrast to the NVRA, AVR systems employ an opt-out voter
registration model. In the AVR opt-out registration model, a person who
comes into contact with agencies designated by the state are conditionally

277 History of AVR & Implementation Dates, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (June 19, 2019),
http://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/history-avr-implementation-dates [https://perma.cc/49FF-6PFR]
(reporting that the state has seen registration rates quadruple since the implementation of AVR).
278 Automatic Voter Registration Bills, 2015–Present, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (July 10, 2019)
https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/automatic-voter-registration-bills-2015-present
[https://perma.cc/BNM4-VYN6] (listing all AVR bills introduced by states since 2015).
279 52 U.S.C. § 20503 (2012); id. § 20506.
280 JERRY T. JENNINGS, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, P20-466, VOTING
AND REGISTRATION IN THE ELECTION OF NOVEMBER 1992, at vi tbl.B (1993).
281 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, VOTING AND REGISTRATION IN THE ELECTION OF NOVEMBER 2016:
TABLE 4C (2017), https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/voting-and-registration/p20580.html [https://perma.cc/J732-VA78].
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registered to vote.282 In one model (e.g., California), the conditionally
registered voters are given the chance to opt out while at the agency or, if
they do not opt out, are given an opportunity to declare their partisan
affiliation. In another model (e.g., Oregon), conditionally registered voters
are sent a registration notification card in the mail in which they can opt to
decline to be registered or can choose their party affiliation.283 Conditionally
registered voters who take no action are registered as unaffiliated voters.284
Proponents argue that by shifting the default to being registered, it will
increase the number of persons registered to vote.285 It is too early to tell, but
the proponents’ arguments are consistent with findings from behavioral
economics that opt-out regimes secure more participation than opt-in
regimes.286
From the perspective of creating a full-information environment that
can combat passive voter suppression, more registered voters as a result of
AVR means more complete registration lists with accompanying voting
history and partisan affiliation. In this fuller information environment,
campaigns should have stronger incentives to contact registered persons that
would have remained unregistered under the NVRA’s opt-in approach. But
there are two factors that might reduce the effect of the full-information
environment on passive voter suppression. First, campaigns will likely still
rely on information about individuals’ voting histories in deciding who to
contact. That will play to the disadvantage of lower income voters who tend
to have a less substantial voting history.
Second, many people might not return the voting registration card in
the opt-out regime. The decision to not return the voter registration card will,
of course, mean that the person becomes a permanently registered voter by
default. But it will also mean that the person assumes an unaffiliated voter
status. The AVR opt-out regime is therefore likely to increase the number of
unaffiliated voters. Worse yet, the AVR opt-out regime might actually
increase campaign’s uncertainty regarding unaffiliated individuals’ partisan
preferences.287
282 See, e.g., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, THE CASE FOR AUTOMATIC VOTER REGISTRATION
6–7 (2016), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/Case_for_Automatic_Voter_
Registration.pdf [https://perma.cc/89C6-UGG2] (describing how automatic voter registration works).
283 Automatic Voter Registration, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Apr. 22, 2019), http://www.ncsl.
org/research/elections-and-campaigns/automatic-voter-registration.aspx [https://perma.cc/57LA-MJJ2].
284 Id.
285 Id.
286 See, e.g., Brigitte C. Madrian, Applying Insights from Behavioral Economics to Policy Design,
6 ANN. REV. ECON. 663, 668 (2014) (describing the increased participation rates associated with opt-out
automatic enrollment in retirement savings plans).
287 Kevin Morris & Peter Dunphy, Brennan Ctr. for Justice, AVR Impact on State Voter Registration,
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE 4 (Apr. 11, 2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2019-
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In an opt-in regime, registered voters consciously choose to be
unaffiliated, which is an indication that the registered voter does not strongly
support either party. But in an opt-out regime, where unaffiliated status is the
default, the campaign has no way of knowing whether the registered voter is
unaffiliated because she does not strongly support either party or simply
because she failed to send the notification card back. The latter type of
unaffiliated registered voter might clearly support one party or the other, but
the campaign would have no way of knowing. The increased uncertainty
about the meaning of unaffiliated voter status might lead campaigns to
increasingly employ mobilization strategies that target declared party
affiliates. To the extent AVR results in registered poor voters being
disproportionately unaffiliated with either party, campaigns might continue
to bias their mobilization activities away from the poor.
States could get around this problem by being more proactive in seeking
out the partisan affiliation status of voters. For example, states could follow
the lead of Michigan, which authorizes township, city, and village clerks to
“conduct . . . house-to-house canvass[es] or use such other means of
checking the correctness of registration records as may seem expedient.”288
But such a process would be expensive. Alternatively, states could subsidize
campaigns’ purchase of information from private voter data vendors and
campaigns could use data vendors’ partisan propensity scores to assess the
meaning of unaffiliated status in a way that will inform their calculus of
contact. That would also be costly but, depending on the number of
campaigns, it will likely be less costly than house-to-house canvassing and
would likely yield better information than a partisan affiliation survey.
3. The Partial-Information Environment
A third option is for states to increase the amount of information
campaigns can access along dimensions likely to reduce socioeconomic bias
in contact, while decreasing the amount of information along dimensions
likely to expand socioeconomic bias in contact. The categories into which
each of the three critical pieces of information—registration status, voting
history, and partisan preferences—fall into cannot be determined with any
degree of certainty without empirical testing that is beyond the scope of this
Article. But three viable hypotheses can be derived from the calculus of
contact itself.
First, the effect of information about registration status on campaigns’
mobilization patterns will be contingent on the percentage of the population
08/Report_AVR_Impact_State_Voter_Registration.pdf [https://perma.cc/37NZ-S7RP] (“[C]lose to 85
percent of new voters registered through AVR were automatically marked as nonaffiliated . . . .”).
288 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 168.515 (1954).
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that is registered to vote. In states where nearly all people are registered to
vote, as may come to pass in states that implement AVR, information about
registration status will likely decrease the socioeconomic contact gap for the
reasons described above. In states where only a substantial majority of the
people are registered to vote, as is the case in most states today, information
about registration status is probably an important source of the
socioeconomic contact gap. Given that states are unlikely to abandon
registration systems anytime soon and parties and campaigns will continue
to have access to registration lists, particularly in states that have closed or
semi-closed primaries, the best path forward to reducing the socioeconomic
contact gap is to push for AVR alongside the continued distribution of
registration information.
Our second hypothesis is that information about voting history tends to
expand socioeconomic bias in contact. Campaigns tend to contact people
with higher propensities to vote based on their voting history and the poor
tend to have a less substantial voting history. In states where voting history
is available, it is easier for campaigns to avoid low propensity voters than in
states where voting history is not. Therefore, if the goal is to reduce
socioeconomic bias in contact, states could deny campaigns access to voting
history information.
Unlike voter registration and partisan identification information that is
needed for parties to properly run a closed or semi-closed primary, there is
no obvious systemic reason for campaigns to have access to voter history
information. States might need to collect such information as part of their
efforts to maintain cleaner voter rolls that exclude persons who have moved
out of the state, died, or otherwise become ineligible to vote.289 But there is
no evident reason why this information needs to be shared with campaigns.
There might, however, be voter turnout costs associated with denying
to the public access to individuals’ voting history that are important to
recognize. In an influential experimental study, Professors Alan Gerber,
Donald Green, and Christopher Larimer found that social pressure in the
form of a mailer listing the recent voting record of people in the household
and the recent voting records of those living nearby had a substantial turnout
effect.290 While the control group that did not receive any mailer had a turnout
rate of 29.7%, the treatment group that received a mailer listing the voting
record of people in the household and their neighbors voted at a 37.8% clip.291
289

See 52 U.S.C. § 20507 (2012) (establishing federal requirements for the administration of voting

rolls).
290 Alan S. Gerber et al., Social Pressure and Voter Turnout: Evidence from a Large-Scale Field
Experiment, 102 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 33, 34 (2008).
291 Id. at 38.
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This represented “a remarkable 8.1 percentage-point treatment effect” that
far exceeded the small treatment effect of political mailers on turnout in other
experiments.292
If the state denied public access to voter history information, any
turnout gains arising from social pressure through the use of such
information would be lost. But any turnout gains from such social pressure
are likely to only exacerbate the socioeconomic turnout gap as the poor are
less likely to be in social networks where they will receive pressure to vote.293
It may be better to sacrifice some turnout gains from the use of voting history
for more equitable campaign contact and turnout that may result from
making such information publicly inaccessible.
Our third hypothesis is that the effect of information about partisan
identification on the socioeconomic contact gap is likely to be contingent on
the presumed validity of the information. For reasons having to do with the
nature of primary systems in states that we describe above, we could not
completely deny to campaigns access to registered persons’ partisan
identification information. But we may want to make information about
individuals’ partisan preferences more, not less, available. To the extent that
campaigns have more information about the partisan preferences of the poor,
the calculus of contact suggests that campaigns will often have greater
incentives to contact the poor because they will be able to better assess the
probability that the person contacted will vote favorably for the candidate.
The key is providing reliable information about the poor’s partisan
preferences. And this can be done through the combination of AVR and
active outreach by states to individuals to seek out their partisan preferences,
or via campaigns’ acquisition of vendor data about the probable partisan
leaning of individuals, which the state could subsidize.

292 Id.; see also Gerber & Green, The Effects of Canvassing, supra note 21, at 660 (finding through
an experiment that “direct mail raises turnout by .6 percentage points for each mailing”).
The findings from this study informed the development of two new political apps, VoteWithMe and
OutVote, in time for the 2018 midterm elections. About, VOTEWITHME, https://votewithme.us/
about.html [https://perma.cc/S2ZF-KWK7]; Organizing for Everyone, OUTVOTE, https://www.outvote.io
[https://perma.cc/KX2X-RDHY].
The apps match people’s smartphone contacts with state voter files and then display information about
their contacts’ voting history. Natasha Singer, Did You Vote? Now Your Friends May Know (and Nag
You), N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2D0Xq81 [https://perma.cc/47H4-C46T]. The app then
produces an automated message that the owner of the app can send to encourage their contact to vote in
the election. Id.
The motivating force behind the app is social pressure as contacted persons who receive messages
through the app know that their friends know their past voting history and will know whether they voted
in the election in which they are being nudged to vote. It is not yet clear whether such social pressure
through the app will work to increase the turnout of the nudge recipients, but the findings from the Gerber
et al. study suggests that it might. See Gerber et al., supra note 290, at 38.
293 See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
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In sum, a partial-information environment that could effectively reduce
the socioeconomic bias in contact would include fuller registration through
AVR, no publicly accessible information about individuals’ voting history,
and more accessible and reliable information about individuals’ partisan
preferences. That partial-information environment does have some
drawbacks and may not be easy to implement. Ultimately, further empirical
testing is necessary to assess which, if any, of the information environments
reduces passive suppression, but the partial-information environment might
be the best of the three.
CONCLUSION
We may never return to the Jim Crow Era of complete
disenfranchisement of an entire community of eligible voters, but the active
voter suppression threat remains real. In fact, the coming years will likely
see more efforts to actively suppress the vote. Voter ID laws will probably
be enacted in more states, voter roll purges could emerge as a common
election year practice, early voting might continue to be reduced or
eliminated altogether, and registration rules may be tightened further. These
new voter suppression tools could further enhance partisan advantage and
give candidates victories that they would not have had in the absence of these
laws. To ensure the fairness of elections and the opportunity for everyone to
vote, voting rights advocates should continue their fights against these laws
and in favor of laws that make voting easier.
But if the goal is an inclusive democracy, then voting rights advocates
will need to target something more than the new voter suppression. State
decisions to increase barriers to voting are not the primary source of the large
disparities in participation between different classes of voters, disparities that
not only exist between the rich and the poor but also between the old and
young and Latinos and other racial and ethnic groups. Removing all tangible
cost barriers to voting will not lead to participatory equality between these
groups.
To achieve the goal of an inclusive democracy, we also need to look at
campaign mobilization practices. Through their door-to-door canvasses,
calls, and mailers to potential voters, campaigns reduce the most important
cost barriers to voting: the cost of the information necessary to give people
a reason to vote. Through these contacts, campaigns also increase
individuals’ sense of duty to vote, a critical intangible benefit from voting.
But campaigns focused on winning elections contact some and ignore others
in ways that are biased along class lines. This uneven distribution of contacts,
which we label passive voter suppression, has undercut the goal of
democratic inclusion.
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Voting rights advocates therefore need to develop strategies to combat
passive voter suppression. We offer one here that focuses on changing the
amount and type of information about potential voters that is available to
campaigns. An information environment that provides campaigns with
information about all voters’ partisan orientations (through automatic voter
registration) and denies to campaigns information about individuals’ voting
histories may have the strongest effect on reducing passive voter
suppression. But this legal intervention represents only a first step that will
need to be followed up with other legal responses designed to increase the
incentives for campaigns to reach out to the politically marginalized.
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